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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD
The old philosophical question, how to set the boundaries 
of semantics versus syntax, is becoming an essential 
issue again based on the current challenges in computer 
engineering, such as various attempts at constructing 
“semantic web” and other semantic systems. Those are 
the systems able to understand and disambiguate natural 
language, with its metaphorical meanings of the words and 
context dependencies. In a broader sense, such semantic 
engines would be able to disambiguate the meanings in 
human and physical world encountered by self-driving 
machines, and other autonomous systems. Such ability 
“to know what’s going on,” as Riccardo Sanz would put it, 
is essential for smooth integration of (semi-)autonomous 
cognitive engines within the universe of human agents. We 
are delighted to publish Bill Rapaport’s article “Semantics 
as Syntax,” which is an important voice in this debate. The 
author views semantics as an interpretation over syntax, 
fully reducible to the latter. It is an important re-statement 
of Rapaport’s 1988 position that “purely syntactic symbol-
manipulation of a computational natural-language-
understanding system’s knowledge base suffices for it to 
understand natural language.” Rapaport’s new defense 
of this traditional view is an important contribution to the 
current debate.
We are glad to publish the third and last article by the 
duo of Jun Tani and Jeffrey White, who have recently 
moved from KAIST in Korea to the Okinawa Institute of 
Science and Technology (OIST). In this article, important for 
philosophers and scientists alike, the authors develop the 
idea of “synthetic neurorobotics studies” as essential for 
grasping various senses of machine consciousness. 
Kristen Zbikowski’s interview with Stephen Thaler brings to 
the readers several new ideas on machine consciousness, 
many of them already applied and functioning within 
the framework of imagination engines. Those are 
advanced cognitive architectures that implement dream-
like information processing—based largely on image 
transformation and combination—in order to attain creative 
cognitive engines that seem useful in the areas so divergent 
as new product development, investment strategies, and 
the arts. We close the issue with a philosophical cartoon 
by Riccardo Manzotti, who is currently a Fulbright Scholar 
at MIT—those cartoons have become a yearly feature of 
this newsletter. The current cartoon develops a case for 
ontological relationism. We want to congratulate the author 
on his new position as professor of theoretical philosophy 
at the Libera Università di Lingue e Comunicazione IULM 
University at Milan.
Last but not least, I want to emphasize the importance of 
the note from the chair of this committee, Marcello Guarini. 
The note includes up-to-date information about the 
sessions organized by the APA Committee on Philosophy 
and Computers for all the three APA divisional meetings in 
2018—Central, Eastern, and Pacific. It also includes the list 
of all current committee members. It is exciting to see the 




The members of the APA Committee on Philosophy and 
Computers have been hard at work putting together 
sessions for upcoming APA meetings.
During the 2018 Eastern APA meeting, the winner of the 2016 
Barwise prize, Dr. Edward Zalta (Stanford University), will be 
acknowledged. Dr. Zalta will present an address entitled 
“How Computational Results Can Improve Metaphysics: 
Case Study.” The commentators on the paper will be 
Christopher Menzel (Texas A&M University) and Branden 
Fitelson (Northeastern University). Commentary will be 
followed by replies and discussion with the audience. 
Committee member Gary Mar will chair the session, which 
will take place on Wednesday, January 3, from 1:00 to 3:00 
p.m. Please check the meeting program for any last-minute 
changes.
At the 2018 Central APA meeting, our own newsletter 
editor, Peter Boltuc, will be chairing a session on Machine 
Consciousness. The session will include the following 
papers by philosophers: “The Myth of Mind Uploading,” 
by our committee member Gualtieri Piccinini, and “Three 
Senses of Effectively Computable,” by Jack Copeland 
and Peter Boltuc. It will also include papers by leading 
AI experts: “Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of 
Unified Sentience,” by Stephen Thaler, and a paper on 
robot psychology by Troy Kelley.
At the 2018 Pacific APA meeting, philosophy and computers 
committee member Fritz MacDonald will chair a session 
on New Technologies in Online Teaching of Philosophy. 
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DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS, 
AND CENTER FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, 
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
The Chinese room shows what we knew all along: 
syntax by itself is not sufficient for semantics. (Does 
anyone actually deny this point, I mean straight 
out? Is anyone actually willing to say, straight out, 
that they think that syntax, in the sense of formal 
symbols, is really the same as semantic content, 
in the sense of meanings, thought contents, 
understanding, etc.?)1
My thesis is that (suitable) purely syntactic symbol-
manipulation of a computational natural-language-
understanding system’s knowledge base suffices 
for it to understand natural language.2
Does that make any sense? Yes: Everything makes 
sense. The question is: What sense does it make?
– Stuart C. Shapiro (in conversation, 
April 19, 1994)
1 SYNTAX VS. SEMANTICS
Does syntax suffice for semantics? John Searle famously 
says that it does not.3 I have argued that it does.4
More precisely, I have argued that semantics is nothing but 
syntax. These slogans need to be cashed out.
1.1 SYNTAX
Let’s begin with syntax. The word “syntax” has at least two 
meanings: a narrow or specific one, and a wide or general 
one. On the narrow (and perhaps more usual) meaning, the 
syntax of a language is its grammar, and the syntax of a 
logic is its proof theory.
The wide meaning, which is the one I want to focus on, 
includes both narrow meanings, but goes beyond them. It 
is roughly synonymous with Charles Morris’s “syntactics”: 
“the formal relation of signs to one another . . . in abstraction 
from the relations of signs to objects or to interpreters.”5 
(The former relations are those of semantics, the latter are 
those of pragmatics.)
On the wide view, syntax is the study of the properties of 
the “symbols” of an (uninterpreted) “symbol system” and 
the relations among them, including how the symbols can 
be “manipulated.” But “symbol” is a charged term, used by 
some to mean an interpreted “sign”: a sign together with 
its meaning. Worse, “sign” is yet another charged term, 
because signs are supposed to be signs of something. I 
want to focus on the “sign” or “symbol” itself, devoid of 
any meaning, so I will use the more neutral terms “mark,” 
“mark system,” and “mark manipulation” instead of the 
At the time of publication, the times and dates have not 
been finalized. Please check the APA meeting programs 
as final particulars become available online. In the interest 
of building our community of scholarship, we encourage 
readers of the newsletter to attend the above events.
Readers of the newsletter also are encouraged to contact 
any member of the committee if they are interested in 
proposing or collaborating on an APA symposium that 
engages any of the wide range of issues associated with 
philosophy and computing. We are happy to continue 
facilitating the presentation of high-quality research in this 
area.
The current members of the committee are listed below:
Marcello Guarini (chair, 2019) (mguarini@uwindsor.ca)




Susan G. Sterrett (2020)
Dylan E. Wittkower (2019)
Peter Boltuc (newsletter editor) (epetebolt@gmail.com)
The committee thanks Colin Allen and William Barry, whose 
terms have come to an end—their commitment to the 
committee and the community of scholars it serves is very 
much appreciated.
CALL FOR PAPERS
It is our pleasure to invite all potential authors to submit to the 
APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers. Committee 
members have priority since this is the newsletter of the 
committee, but anyone is encouraged to submit. We 
publish papers that tie in philosophy and computer science 
or some aspect of “computers”; hence, we do not publish 
articles in other sub-disciplines of philosophy. All papers 
will be reviewed, but only a small group can be published.
The area of philosophy and computers lies among a number 
of professional disciplines (such as philosophy, cognitive 
science, computer science). We try not to impose writing 
guidelines of one discipline, but consistency of references 
is required for publication and should follow the Chicago 
Manual of Style. Inquiries should be addressed to the 
editor, Dr. Peter Boltuc, at pboltu@sgh.waw.pl
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“truth preserving,” because I take “truth” to be a semantic 
property. (I take correspondence theories of truth to be 
semantic. Coherence theories seem to be more syntactic, 
or holistic. We’ll come back to holism in §3.1.)
But I want to be even more general than Morris: I see no 
reason not to include systems that might not normally be 
considered to be languages. On my view, any set of objects 
has a syntax if the objects have properties and stand in 
relations to each other. On this view, even biological neural 
networks have syntax,10 as does the world itself. This seems 
to be consistent with Carnap: “The syntax of . . . any . . . 
calculus, is concerned . . . with the structures of possible 
serial orders … of any elements whatsoever.”11
1.2 SEMANTICS
Semantics, of course, is the study of meaning and truth. 
The meaning of some piece of language (a word, phrase, 
sentence, what have you) might be its referent (if there 
is one), i.e., something else, in the world, rather than in 
the language (with the exception, of course, of things like 
names of words, whose referents are other words in the 
language—after all, language is part of the world). Or the 
meaning of some piece of language might be its sense 
(Fregean or otherwise)—again, something else, outside 
of the language, though not, perhaps, “in the world.” Or 
it might be a Meinongian object or an idea in a mind.12 
But, in any case, the meaning of a piece of language is not 
typically thought of as being part of the language; rather, 
it is something else that the piece of language stands in 
relation to. One exception is conceptual-role or holistic 
theories of meaning, but we’ll come back to that in §3.1.13
So, whereas syntax only requires one domain (call it the 
“syntactic domain”), semantics requires two: a syntactic 
domain and a “semantic domain.” The syntactic domain is 
the thing that needs to be understood, to be interpreted. 
The semantic domain is the thing that provides the 
understanding, that provides the interpretation.
Following Morris, then, I take semantics to be the study of 
the relations between the marks of two systems.14 Because 
syntax is the study of the properties and relations of a single 
system, it would seem that, indeed, syntax does not suffice 
for semantics. Yet I argue that it does. Let’s look into this 
more closely.15
2 TWO SYNTACTIC SYSTEMS
2.1 THE SYNTAX OF L
On the standard view, a syntactic domain is usually some 
(formal or formalized) language L, which is described 
syntactically—that is, in terms of its marks and rules for 
manipulating them. Thus, for instance, L might be described 
as having terms, perhaps of two (simple, or atomic) kinds: 
individual constants a, b, . . . (e.g., proper names or other 
nouns) and individual variables u, v, . . . (e.g., pronouns). 
“New” (complex, or molecular) terms (e.g., noun phrases) 
can be constructed from previously given or previously 
constructed (“old”) ones (whether atomic or molecular) 
by means of function symbols of various arities, f , g, . . . , 
fi, . . . (e.g., “the father of . . .,” “the average of . . . and 
___”), together with “grammar” rules specifying the “legal” 
more familiar “sign,” “symbol,” “ symbol system,” and 
“symbol manipulation.”
This is a kind of very “pure” syntax. It is “formal” syntax in 
the sense of Carnap, where an item
is to be called formal when no reference is made in 
it either to the meaning of the symbols . . . or to the 
sense of the expressions . . . but simply and solely 
to the kinds and order of the symbols from which 
the expressions are constructed. . . . Pure syntax 
is concerned with the possible arrangements, 
without reference either to the nature of the things 
which constitute the various elements, or to the 
question as to which of the possible arrangements 
of these elements are anywhere realized.6
Dale Jacquette does not believe in the existence of such 
“pure syntax . . . entirely divorced from semantics.” But 
all that he says in defense is that such marks “lack even 
derivative meaning or intentionality.”7 (“Intentionality,” 
by the way, seems to have two different, albeit related, 
meanings in the literature. In a technical sense deriving 
from Brentano, it means “directedness to an object”; in 
the sense in which Jacquette, Searle, and others use it in 
the context of the Chinese Room Argument, it seems to 
be roughly synonymous with “cognition,” “understanding,” 
or even “consciousness.”) Jacquette goes on to say that 
even purely syntactic “computer programs . . . are always 
externally interpreted.”8 I agree with the latter comment, 
but I still think that there is such a thing as pure syntax in 
the sense that I am using it here. But this debate would 
take us too far astray.9
The (purely) syntactic properties of marks include their 
shape (what a mark looks like and how it differs from 
other marks in the system), an inventory of the marks of 
the system (an “alphabet” or “vocabulary” of “primitive,” 
or “basic,” marks), and relations spelling out how marks 
may be combined to form more complex ones from simpler 
ones (usually given by recursive rules that take primitive, 
or given, or “atomic” marks as the base case, and show 
how to combine them to produce “molecular” marks, or 
“well- formed formulas” [wffs]). This much would normally 
be called the “grammar” of the system if the system were 
to be thought of as a language.
As I noted above, some mark systems, especially those that 
really are languages (formal or otherwise) might have other 
syntactic properties and relations, in addition to shape, 
inventory, and grammatical combinatory relations. For 
instance, some molecular marks—well-formed formulas—
might be taken as axioms. And some sets of molecular 
marks might stand in certain relations such that, whenever 
some of them have been collected together, others—
called “theorems”—might then be “legally” allowed to 
be added to the collection. Here what I have in mind are 
transformation rules or rules of inference. Thus, in addition 
to “grammatical” syntax, a set might also have a “logical” 
or “proof-theoretic” syntax. The production of molecular 
wffs and theorems is usually what is meant by “symbol 
manipulation” (i.e., mark manipulation). Note, however, 
that I am not requiring the transformation rules to be 
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I want to show you a certain class K of marks of L’. To talk 
about them, I’ll need another set of marks that are not part 
of L’, so we’ll let ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘B1’, ‘B2’, . . . be variables ranging 
over the members of K. Now, here are the members of K:
1. A1, . . . , Ai, . . . ∈ K
2. If A, B ∈ K, then [F0(A)
] , [F1(A, B)
] , [F2(A, B)
] , [F3(A, B)
] 
∈ K.
3. Nothing else is in K.
We could ask questions of this formal mark system. For 
instance, which molecular marks are in K? By suitable mark 
manipulation, following (1)–(3), we can ascertain that A1, 
A100, F0(A100), F0(F0(A100)), F3(F0(F0(A100)), F2(A1, A100)) ∈ K, but 
that F0(F0), B ∉ K.
Now, let’s make L’ a bit more interesting. Let H ⊆ K; let A, B ∈ 
K; and let’s say that an (H , A)-sequence
is a sequence of members of K such that A is the last item in 
the sequence, and, if B is in the sequence, then either B ∈ H 
or there is a set {B1, . . . , Bn | (∀1 ≤ i ≤ n)[Bi ∈ K]} such that 
[R(B1, 
. . . , Bn; B)
] ∈ R , where R is defined as follows (remember that 
‘R’ is a mark of L’; I am defining R as consisting of certain 
sequences of marks beginning with ‘R’):
R 1. [R(A; F1(A, B))
] ∈ R 
R 2. [R(B; F1(A, B))
] ∈ R
R 3. [R(F1(A, B), F0(A); B)
] ∈ R
R 4. [R(F1(A, B), F0(B); A)
] ∈ R
R 5. [R(F2(A, B); A)
] ∈ R
R 6. [R(F2(A, B); B)
] ∈ R
R 7. [R(A, B; F2(A, B))
] ∈ R 
R 8. [R(F3(A, B), A; B)
] ∈ R
R 9. If there is an (H , B)-sequence whose first item is A, then 
[R(; F3(A, B))
] ∈ R
[Note: There is no symbol between “(” and “;”]
R 10. If there is an (H , [F2(B, F0(B))
])-sequence whose first 
item is A, then [R(; F0(A))
] ∈ R
R 11. If there is an (H , [F2(B, F0(B))
])-sequence whose first 
item is F0(A), then 
[R(; A)] ∈ R
R 12. Nothing else is in R.
We can now ask more questions of our system; e.g., 
which marks A are such that [R(; A)] ∈ R? By suitable mark 
manipulations, following R 1–R 12, we can ascertain that, 
e.g., R(; F3(A0, A0)) ∈ R (this is actually fairly trivial, since 〈A0〉 
is an (A0, A0)-sequence whose first item is A0).
structure (or “spellings”) of such molecular terms (say, if t1, 
. . . , tn are terms, and f
n is an n-place function symbol, then 
[fn (t1, . . . , tn)
] is a term).16
In addition, L will have predicate symbols of various 
arities: A, . . . , Z, Ai, . . . (e.g., verb phrases); connectives 
and quantifiers: ¬, ∨, ∀, . . . (e.g., “it is not the case that . . . ,” 
“. . . or ___,” “for all . . . , it is the case that ___”); and more 
“grammar” rules specifying the “legal” structure of well-
formed formulas (or sentences): If t1, . . . , tn are terms, and 
Pn is an n-place predicate symbol, then [Pn(t1, . . . , tn)
] is a 
well-formed formula (wff); if ϕ and ψ are wffs, and v is an 
individual variable, then [¬ϕ], [(ϕ ∨ ψ)], [∀v[ϕ]] are wffs.
Note that L is a language. Sometimes L is augmented with 
a logic: Certain wffs of L are distinguished as axioms (or 
“primitive theorems”), and rules of inference are provided 
that specify how to produce “new” theorems from “old” 
ones. For instance, if ϕ and [(ϕ → ψ)] are theorems, then so 
is ψ. A proof of a wff ψ (from a set of wffs Σ) is a sequence 
of wffs ending with ψ such that every wff in the sequence is 
either an axiom (or a member of Σ) or follows from previous 
wffs in the sequence by one of the rules of inference.
And so on. I will assume that the reader is familiar with the 
general pattern.17 The point is that all we have so far are 
marks and rules for manipulating them either linguistically 
(to form wffs) or logically (to form theorems). All we have 
so far is syntax in Morris’s sense.
Actually, in my desire to make the example perspicuous, I 
may have given you a misleading impression by talking of 
“language” and “logic,” of “nouns” and “verb phrases,” etc. 
For such talk tends to make people think either that I was 
talking, albeit in a very strange way, about language and 
nouns and verbs—good old familiar languages like English 
with nouns and verbs like “dog” and “run”18—or that I had 
that in the back of my mind as an intended interpretation 
of the marks and rules. But marks are merely (perhaps) 
physical inscriptions or sounds that have only some very 
minimal features such as having distinguished, relatively 
unchanging shapes capable of being recognized when 
encountered again.
2.2 THE SYNTAX OF L’
So, let me offer a somewhat less familiar syntactic domain 
L’, which I will call, this time, not a “language,” but merely a 
“mark system.” First, I need to show you the marks of L’. 
To really make my point, these should be quite arbitrary: 
say, boxes, circles, or squiggles of various kinds. But I will 
make life a bit easier for the reader and the typesetter by 
using letters and numerals.
L’ consists of the following marks:
A1, . . . , Ai, . . . ;
F0, F1, F2, F3;
(, ), ,, ;; [i.e., a left-parenthesis, a right-
parenthesis, a comma, and a 
semi-colon]
R
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syntactic, questions. The second sort is, in short: What’s the 
meaning of all this? What do the marks mean (if anything)? 
What, for example, is so special about the members of 
K or the marks of the form [R(; A)]? To answer this sort of 
question, we must go outside the syntactic domain: We 
must provide “external” entities that the marks mean (that 
they can be understood in terms of), and we must show 
the mappings—the associations, the correspondences—
between the two domains.
But, as I have said elsewhere,
Now a curious thing happens: I need to show you 
the semantic domain. If I’m very lucky, I can just 
point it out to you—we can look at it together, and 
I can describe the correspondences (“The symbol 
A37 means that red thing over there”). But, more 
often, I have to describe the semantic domain to 
you in . . . symbols [i.e., marks], and hope that the 
meaning of those symbols will be obvious to you.25
So, let’s provide a semantic interpretation of our first 
formal mark system, L. Since L had individual terms, 
function marks, and predicate marks26—which could be 
combined in various (but not arbitrary) ways—I need to 
provide meanings for each such mark as well as for their 
legal combinations. So, we’ll need a non-empty set D of 
things that the terms will mean—a Domain of interpretation 
(sometimes called a Domain, or universe, of discourse)—
and sets F and R of things that the function and relation 
symbols will mean, respectively. These three sets can 
be collectively called M (for Model). What’s in D? Well, 
anything you want to talk or think about. What are in F and 
R? Functions and relations on D of various arities—i.e., 
anything you want to be able to say about the things in D. 
That’s our ontology, what there is.
Let’s pause a moment here for an important point: D has 
members; the members of D have properties; and the 
members of D stand in various relations to each other. The 
study of such objects, their properties, and the relations 
among them is ontology. But I have defined the study of 
objects, their properties, and the relations among them to 
be syntax. Thus, ontology is simply the syntax of the semantic 
domain.
Now for the correspondences. To say what a mark of L 
means in M (what the meaning, located in M, of a mark of 
L is), we can define an interpretation function I : L → M that 
will assign to each mark of L something in M (or it might be 
an interpretation relation if we wish to allow for ambiguity), 
as follows:
1. If t is an individual term of L , then I(t ) ∈ D.
(Which element of D? Whichever you want, or, if 
we spell out L and D in more detail, I’ll tell you; 
for example, perhaps I (“Barack Obama”) = the 
44th President of the U.S., if “Barack Obama” is 
an individual constant of L , and D is the set of 
humans.)
2. If f is a function symbol of L , then I( f ) ∈ F.
Hard to read, isn’t it! You feel the strong desire to try to 
understand these squiggles, don’t you? (Are you, perhaps, 
beginning to feel like Searle-in-the-Chinese-Room?) You 
would probably feel better if I showed you some other 
domain—a semantic domain—with which you were more 
comfortable, more familiar, into which you could map these 
squiggles. I will. But not yet.
Of course, I could be sadistic and suggest that you 
“get used to” L’ by manipulating its symbols and learning 
more about the members of K and R . After all, as John 
von Neumann allegedly said, “in mathematics you don’t 
understand things. You just get used to them.”19 “Getting 
used to” a syntactic domain is the base case of a recursive 
Fundamental Principle of Understanding:20
To understand a syntactic domain S is either:
1. to “get used to” S, or else
2. to understand S in terms of a semantic domain T.
The latter is semantic understanding in Morris’s sense: 
understanding one thing in terms of something else. The 
former is what I have called “syntactic understanding”:21 
understanding something in terms of itself. And in the 
case of semantic understanding, how do you understand 
the semantic domain T? Normally, T is assumed to be 
antecedently understood. But that has to mean that it 
is understood syntactically—you have gotten used to 
it. If T is not antecedently understood, then it has to be 
considered as a syntactic domain in its own right and 
understood in terms of yet another semantic domain T’. 
And so on. Ultimately, I claim, all understanding is syntactic 
understanding (the base case of the recursion).22
But “syntactic understanding”—the sort of thing that 
you come to have by getting used to the syntactic 
domain—does not seem, on the surface, to be any kind 
of “real” understanding. This is the intuition underlying 
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and its earlier incarnation 
in the guise of Leibniz’s mill.23 Where is the meaning or 
understanding (or “intentionality” or “consciousness”) in 
this kind of “meaningless” (yet rule-based, or regulated) 
mark manipulation? As I read him, Jacquette suggests that 
it can generate understanding,24 in turn suggesting that 
what we have here is a clash of fundamental intuitions: 
Some (e.g., Searle) say that such mark systems and mark 
manipulation cannot suffice for understanding; others 
(perhaps Jacquette, and certainly I) say that it can.
In any case, you could just try to get used to L’ by doing 
mark manipulation, and I believe that you would thereby 
come to understand it. But I won’t be that mean. First, we 
need to move away from pure syntax and find out what 
semantics consists of.
2.3 A SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF L
Given some syntactic domain—some (formal) mark 
system—one can ask two sorts of questions about it. The 
first sort is exemplified by those we asked above: What 
are the members of K? Of R? These are purely “internal,” 
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rather, it would be a kind of syntactic understanding!)
In less ideal circumstances, there might be marks of L 
that are not interpretable in M; in that case, I would be 
a partial function. Such is the case when L is English and 
M is the world (“unicorn” is an English word, but unicorns 
don’t exist), though if we “enlarge” or “extend” M in some 
way—e.g., if we take M to be Meinong’s Aussersein instead 
of the actual world—then we can make I total.29
In another less ideal circumstance, “Hamlet’s Law” might 
hold:30 There are more things in M than in L; i.e., there are 
elements of M not expressible in L: I is not onto. And, as 
noted earlier, I might be a relation, not a function, so L 
would be ambiguous. There is another, more global, sense 
in which L could be ambiguous: By choosing a different 
M (and a different I), we could give the marks of L 
entirely distinct meanings. Worse, the two Ms need not be 
isomorphic. (This can happen in at least two ways. First, the 
cardinalities of the two Ds could differ. Second, suppose 
L is a language for expressing mathematical group theory. 
Then M1 could be an infinite cyclic group (e.g., the integers 
under addition), and M2 could be M1 × M1, which, unlike 
M1, has two disjoint subgroups—except for the identity.)
31
2.4 A SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF L’
Let’s consider an example in detail; I’ll tell you what the 
marks of L’ mean. First, I need to show you M. To do that, I 
need to show you D: D will include the marks: ϕ1, . . . , ϕi, . . . 
(so, I’m explaining one set of marks in terms of another set 
of marks; be patient). D will also include these marks: ¬, 
∨, ∧, →. Now I can tell you about K (in what follows, let Ai be 
the ith atomic marks of K, let ϕi be the ith atomic marks of 
D, and let A, B ∈ K):
I (Ai) = ϕi
I (F0) = ¬
I (F1) = ∨
I (F2) = ∧
I (F3) =→
I ( [F0(A)
]) = [¬ I (A)]
I ( [F1(A, B)
]) = [(I (A) ∨ I (B))]
I ( [F2(A, B)
]) = [(I (A) ∧ I (B))]
I ( [F3(A, B)
]) = [(I (A) → I (B))]
I assume, of course, that you know what “¬”, [(I (A) → I (B))], 
etc., are (namely, the negation sign, a material conditional 
wff, etc.). So, the elements of K are just wffs of propositional 
logic (as if you didn’t know)!
What about R? Well: I (R) = ⊢ (where ⊢ ∈ R and where R, of 
course, is part of M); i.e., R means the deducibility relation 
on wffs of propositional logic. So, the elements of R are 
rules of inference:
3. If [f (t1, . . . , tn)
] is a (molecular) term of L, then 
I ([f (t1, . . . , tn)
]) = I ( f )(I (t1), . . . , I (tn)) ∈ D.
(I.e., the interpretation of [f (t1, . . . , tn)
] will be the 
result of applying (a) the function that is the 
interpretation of f to (b) the elements of D that are 
the interpretations of the ti; and the result will be 
an element of D.)
4. If P is a predicate symbol of L, then I(P) ∈ R.
So far, so good. Now, what do wffs mean? Those 
philosophers and logicians who take n-place functions and 
relations to be ordered n-tuples—functions and relations 
“in extension”—tend to talk about “truth values” of wffs 
rather than “meanings.” Others, who take functions and 
relations “in intension” can talk about the meanings of wffs 
as being “states of affairs” or “situations” or “propositions,” 
variously defined. I, myself, fall in the latter camp, but for 
the sake of simplicity of exposition, I’ll go the other route for 
now. Continuing, then, we have:
5. If ϕ is a wff, then I(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1}, where, intuitively, 
we’ll say that ϕ is “true” if I(ϕ) = 1 and that ϕ 
is “false” if I(ϕ) = 0. In particular, where P is an 
n-place predicate symbol, t1, . . . , tn are terms, v is 
an individual variable, and ϕ, ψ are wffs:
(a) I( [P(t1, . . . , tn)
]) = 1 iff 〈I(t1), . . . , I(tn)〉 ∈ I(P).
(b) I( [¬ϕ]) = 1 iff I(ϕ) = 0
(c) I( [(ϕ ∨ ψ)]) = 1 iff I(ϕ) = 1 or I(ψ) = 1 (or both)
(d) I([∀v[ϕ]]) = 1 iff I ’(ϕ) = 1 for every I ’ that 
differs from I at most on what I ’ assigns 
to v.
Now, what kind of function is I ? Clearly, it is a 
homomorphism; i.e., it satisfies a principle of 
compositionality: The interpretation of a molecular symbol is 
determined by the interpretations of its atomic constituents 
in the manner spelled out above.
In the ideal case, I is an isomorphism—a 1–1 and onto 
homomorphism; that is, every item in M is the meaning of 
just one symbol of L . (Being “onto” is tantamount to L ’s 
being “complete.”) Perhaps isomorphism is less than ideal, 
at least for the case of natural languages. David P. Wilkins 
has observed that when one studies, not isolated or made-
up sentences, but
real, contextualised utterances . . . it is often the 
case that all the elements that one would want to 
propose as belonging to semantic structure have 
no overt manifestations in syntactic structure. . . . 
[T]he degree of isomorphism between semantic 
and syntactic structure is mediated by pragmatic 
and functional concerns. . . .27
In this ideal situation, M is a virtual duplicate or mirror 
image of L . (Indeed, M could be L itself,28 but that’s not 
very interesting or useful for semantic understanding of L ; 
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our example, the unfamiliar L’ was interpreted in terms of 
the more familiar M (i.e., L), which, in turn, was interpreted 
in terms of M’. And how is it that we understand what states 
of affairs in the world are? Well . . . we’ve just gotten used to 
them. (We’ll come back to this in §4.)
Finally, note that M in our example is a sort of “swing” 
domain: It serves as the semantic domain relative to L’ and 
as the syntactic domain relative to M’. We can have a “chain” 
of domains, each of which except the first is a semantic 
domain for the one before it, and each of which except for 
the last is a syntactic domain for the one following it. To 
understand any domain in the chain, we must be able to 
understand the “next” one. How do we understand the last 
one? Syntactically.33
3 SYNTAX SUFFICES FOR SEMANTICS
3.1 SYNTACTIC UNDERSTANDING
Let’s take stock. Given any (non-empty) set S of objects 
of any kind, the specification of the properties of S’s 
members and of the relations that they stand in to each 
other is the syntax of S. These properties and relations 
may be of different kinds, so we might be able to identify 
a “grammatical” syntax of S as well as a “logical” or “proof-
theoretic” syntax of S. We can understand S in terms of 
its syntax by “getting used to” manipulating its members 
according to these properties and relations. This is syntactic 
understanding.34
Syntactic understanding is holistic in the following way: The 
syntax of S can be represented by a graph whose vertices are 
the members of S and whose edges represent its properties 
and relations. Such a graph is often called a “semantic 
network,” and such networks have rightly been criticized 
as really being “syntactic” networks. (The Semantic Web is 
really a syntactic web.35) In such a network, the “meaning” 
of any vertex is its location in the network—its relations to 
all other vertices in the network. This is conceptual-role 
semantics or semantic holism. Semantic holism is just more 
syntax.36
3.2 SEMANTIC UNDERSTANDING
But there is another kind of understanding: semantic 
understanding. Here, we need another set, T , in terms of 
which we understand S. When we ask what s ∈ S means, 
our answer is some t ∈ T . But T will have its own syntax. As 
I noted earlier, I see no difference between the syntax of T, 
thus understood, and the ontology of T, though we tend to 
reserve the former term for languages and logics, and the 
latter term for the realms that those languages and logics 
describe or are “about.” Thus, if we are understanding S 
in terms of T, we would speak of the syntax of S and the 
ontology of T, but that is merely a manner of speaking.
Semantic understanding requires relations between S and 
T: relations of meaning, reference, etc. But these relations 
are not among the (internal) relations of S’s syntax or T’s 
ontology. They connect S and T, but are external to both.
3.3 SYNTAX IS SEMANTICS
So, how can we talk about those semantic relations? We 
cannot use either S or T by themselves to talk about them, 
I( [R(A; F1(A, B))
]) = A ⊢ [(A ∨ B)] (i.e., ∨-introduction) 
I( [R(B; F1(A, B))
]) = B ⊢ [(A ∨ B)] (i.e., ∨-introduction) 
I( [R(F1(A, B), F0(A); B)
]) = [(A ∨ B)], [¬A] ⊢ B (i.e., ∨-elimination) 
I( [R(F1(A, B), F0(B); A)
]) = [(A ∨ B)], [¬B] ⊢ A (i.e., ∨-elimination) 
I( [R(F2(A, B); A)
]) = [(A ∧ B)] ⊢A (i.e., ∧-elimination) 
I( [R(F2(A, B); B)
]) = [(A ∧ B)] ⊢ B (i.e., ∧-elimination) 
I( [R(A, B; F2(A, B))
]) = A, B ⊢ [(A ∧ B)] (i.e., ∧-introduction)
I( [R(F3(A, B), A; B)
]) = [(A → B)], A ⊢ B (i.e., →-elimination, or 
Modus Ponens)
Before we can finish interpreting R, I need to tell you 
what an (H , A)-sequence means: It is a proof of I(A) from 
hypotheses I(H ) (where, to be absolutely precise, I should 
specify that, where H = {A, B, . . . } ⊆ K, I(H ) = {I(A), I(B), . . .}). 
So:
I(R9) is:
if there is a proof of I(B) ∈ D from a set of hypotheses 
I(H ) whose first line is I(A), then ⊢ [(I(A) → I(B))] (i.e., 
→-introduction, or Conditional Proof)
I(R10) is:
if there is a proof of [(I(B) ∧ ¬ I(B))] from a set of 
hypotheses I(H ) whose first line is I(A), then ⊢ [¬ I(A)] 
(i.e., ¬-introduction)
I(R11) is:
if there is a proof of [(I(B) ∧ ¬ I(B))] from a set of 
hypotheses I(H ) whose first line is [¬ I(A)], then ⊢ I(A) 
(i.e., ¬-elimination)
So, now you know: L’ is just ordinary propositional logic in 
a weird notation. Of course, I could have told you what the 
marks of L’ mean in terms of a different model M’, where 
D’ consists of states of affairs and Boolean operations on 
them. In that case, L’ just is ordinary propositional logic. 
That is, M is itself a syntactic formal mark system (namely, 
L!) whose meaning can be given in terms of M’, but L’’s 
meaning can be given either in terms of M or in terms of M’.
There are several lessons to be learned from this. First, 
L’ is not a very “natural” mark system. Usually, when one 
presents the syntax of a formal mark system, one already 
has a semantic interpretation in mind, and one designs the 
syntax to “capture” that semantics: The syntax is a model—
an implementation—of the semantics.32
Second, it is possible and occasionally even useful to 
allow one formal syntactic system to be the semantic 
interpretation of another syntactic system. Of course, 
this is only useful if the interpreting syntactic system is 
antecedently understood. How? In terms of another 
domain with which we are antecedently familiar! So, in 
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4.2 COMPUTATIONAL COGNITION
If semantics is nothing but syntax (albeit syntax writ 
large), how do we understand language? How might a 
computer understand language? Searle says that it can’t, 
and I suggested the intuition behind this in §2.2. But I also 
mentioned a way out in §3: via “internalization.” I have 
cashed this out in the series of essays cited in note 4, but I 
will summarize my position here.
What seems to be missing in the Chinese Room is “real” 
semantics—links to the external-world referents of the 
words and sentences of language. How does Searle-in-
the-room (actually, Searle-in-the-room together with the 
instruction book!) know that the word ‘hamburger’ means 
“hamburger” (i.e., refers to hamburgers), or that a certain 
(Chinese) “squiggle” does?
According to the theory I presented above in §3, it 
would seem that an actual hamburger would somehow 
need to be “imported” into Searle-in-the-room’s instruction 
book (the computer program for natural-language 
understanding and generation). Instead, a representative 
of an actual hamburger is thus imported into Searle-in-the-
room’s “mind” (or “semantic network”). The hamburger 
is “internalized.” In the case of a real human being, this 
representative is the end result of, say, the visual process 
of seeing a hamburger (or the olfactory process of smelling 
one, etc.), resulting in a “mental image” of a hamburger. 
(To speak with Kant, it is an “intuition” or concept of a 
hamburger, not the hamburger-in-itself.) More precisely, 
the biological neural network in the human’s brain has 
neurons whose firings represent the word “hamburger,” 
and it has neurons whose firings represent the actual 
hamburger. Both of these sets of neuron firings are in the 
same “language”—the same syntactic system. Call it “U.” As 
in §3.3, U = S ∪ T , where S is the neuron firings of language, 
and T is the neuron firings of perceptual images. U is 
the “language of thought.”42 Yes, T is just “more symbols” 
(as Searle has objected;43 more precisely, T is just more 
neuron firings—the “marks” of T as a syntactic system). 
But that’s how semantics works. The same thing happens 
(or can happen) for computers; though the language of 
thought won’t be a biological neural network (it might 
be a computational semantic network such as SNePS44 or 
an artificial neural network). Thus, a combination of the 
“robot reply” (for internalization) and the “systems reply” 
(because it is never Searle-in-the-room alone) show us how 
to escape the Chinese Room.45
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because the semantic interpretation function is not part of 
S alone or of T alone. But we can talk about them by taking 
the union of S and T; call it U. (In earlier writings about 
computational theories of cognition, I have called this the 
“internalization” of the semantic domain into the syntactic 
domain.37 See §4.2, below.) What is the syntax of U? It 
consists, in part, of the inventory of properties of members 
of U. This includes all of the properties of members of 
S and all of the properties of the members of T. It also 
consists, in part, of the inventory of relations among the 
members of S and the relations among the members of 
T. But it also includes the semantic relations between the 
members of S and the members of T.
So, it is the syntax of U that enables us to talk about the 
semantics of S. Semantics is, thus, just more syntax—the 
syntax of the union of a syntactic domain and its semantic 
domain. QED
4 IMPLICATIONS
I will close with brief comments on two philosophical issues 
that can be illuminated by this theory.
4.1 TWIN EARTH
Hilary Putnam has argued that, not only can “two terms 
. . . have the same extension and yet differ in intension,” 
but that “two terms can . . . differ in extension and have 
the same intension.”38 The latter claim is intended to be 
surprising, because it is typically held that intensions 
determine extensions. Putnam offers his Twin Earth thought 
experiment as a counterexample.
I do not want to rehearse these arguments here, but merely 
point out some similar issues and see what my semantics-
as-syntax theory might have to say.
First, note that the fact that the intensions of “water” (on 
Earth) and “water” (on Twin Earth) might be identical yet 
their extensions (H2O and XYZ, respectively) be different 
parallels a situation with computer programs: By way of 
an “intuition pump,” recall that intensions (and Fregean 
senses) are sometimes modeled as (computable) functions 
or algorithms. Now, it can be the case that a single algorithm 
with a given input can have different outputs depending 
on the context in which those algorithms are executed. For 
one example from the literature, an algorithm (recipe) for 
producing hollandaise sauce when executed on Earth will 
likely produce something quite different when executed on 
the Moon.39 (Strictly speaking, perhaps, the context should 
be taken as part of the input, so the algorithms will, in fact, 
have the same outputs if given exactly the same inputs.40)
Second, the relation of a word to its intension is simply one 
kind of meaning. The relation of a word to its extension is 
another kind of meaning. (There is no such thing as “the” 
meaning of a word; to claim that “meanings ain’t in the 
head” is highly misleading, because some of them are!41) 
What I want to point out is that the relation of an intension 
to an extension is yet another kind of meaning: All three of 
these relations are semantic in my sense, because they are 
relations between two domains.
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ABSTRACT
This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics 
research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes 
introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-
reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the 
role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the 
dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus 
on system criticality and self. It develops a distinction 
between simulated and formal consciousness based on 
this emphasis, reviews Tani’s and colleagues’ work in light 
of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing 
importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in 
regards to most- and myth-consciousness.
1. KNOCKING ON THE DOOR OF THE CHINESE 
ROOM
Prediction is made possible by adaptive 
mechanisms that are supported by learning rules 
that either apply across generations (evolutionary 
adaptation) or within the lifetime of the organism. 
As a result, organisms can deal with a future 
occurrence of the same or similar situations more 
effectively. This is the fundamental organization 
principle of any adaptive system.
– Buszaki, Pyerache, and Kubie1
This series began with Boltuc’s “Is anyone home?” question,2 
responding with a sketch of an agent proactively invested in 
integrating past with present in order to achieve an optimal 
future. Contrary to Boltuc’s naturalistic nonreductionism 
recommending that a “projector” of consciousness be first 
resolved in order to engineer similar in an artificial agent, 
we rejected the notion that consciousness can be isolated 
to any loci of activity, arguing that formal articulation of 
essential dynamics in synthetic neurorobots opens a view 
on the problem of consciousness that is not available to 
biological inquiry, alone. That first paper concluded with 
an introduction to, and the second paper continued with a 
detailed review of, two decades of research by Jun Tani and 
colleagues accounting for self, free will and consciousness 
in neurorobots within the predictive coding framework and 
according with the free energy principle. Central to this 
review was the notion of system criticality, with which the 
continuous perceptual stream is segmented and episodes 
rendered objects for later recall and recomposition, and 
which remains central to the current paper, as well.
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simulate, or approximate, consciousness, and they do so 
by explicit design. Accordingly, simulated consciousness 
is not consciousness on Searle’s account, but he did not 
bar the door on artificial consciousness, either. Rather, he 
pointed to where the key to such may be found. He wrote 
that “understanding the nature of consciousness crucially 
requires understanding how brain processes cause and 
realize consciousness”7 and that conscious artifacts may be 
designed which “duplicate, and not merely simulate, the 
causal powers that [biological] brains have”8 once such an 
understanding is achieved.
As a positive research program, Searle recommended 
correlating neurobiological activity with conscious 
phenomena, checking for causal relationships, and 
developing laws formalizing these relationships.9 He 
identified two ways forward in this industry, the “building 
blocks”10 and “unified field”11 approaches, but dismissed 
the former because “The production of any state of 
consciousness at all by the brain is the production of 
a unified consciousness.”12 At that time, he pointed to 
Llinas et al. and Tononi, Edelman, and Sporns as examples 
of unified field friendly approaches, involving the top-
down integration of system wide information within the 
thalamocortical region.13
Since that time, Tononi and colleagues have developed the 
Integrated Information Theory (IIT). According to the IIT, 
consciousness does not require “contact with the external 
world” but rather “as long as a system has the right internal 
architecture and forms a complex capable of discriminating 
a large number of internal states, it would be highly 
conscious.”14 The “integration” of IIT implies that such a 
system be unified and seek to maintain this unity in the face 
of disintegrative change, with each part of the system able 
to be affected by any other part of the system as measured 
by the irreducibility of its intrinsic cause-effect structure. A 
biological brain exemplifies maximal intrinsic irreducibility 
as a cause-effect structure with definite borders and highly 
integrated information.15 Other systems are irreducible, for 
example two men in conversation, but are not maximally 
irreducible intrinsically as they are not fully integrated. So 
understood, “consciousness is not an all-or-none property,” 
but it is not open to piecemeal assembly either, rather 
increasing with “a system’s repertoire of discriminable 
states.”16 At the minimal level, a “minimally conscious 
system” distinguishes between just two “concepts”17 such 
that “even a binary photo-diode . . . enjoys exactly 1 bit 
of consciousness”18 and systems increase from there with 
their discriminable states.
In conjunction with quantity of consciousness, quality of 
consciousness derives from the structure affording it, 
and the IIT leaves it to engineers to delimit the contents 
of artificial consciousness by “appropriately structuring” 
an agent’s “effective information matrix.”19 As for 
determining which structures deliver which qualities, 
Tononi and colleagues also suggest that inquiry begin 
with biological models, with this understanding first 
tested against personal and then extended to all human 
experience before duplication in artificial systems. In the 
end, the “IIT predicts that whatever the neural correlate of 
consciousness (NCC) turns out to be” it will be the locus of 
The present paper proposes the notion of “formal” 
consciousness to distinguish systems which aim to resolve 
the source of subjectivity in system criticality from work 
aiming for other ends, “simulations” and “reasonable 
approximations” of human consciousness for example 
intent on passing a Turing test without regard for first 
person phenomena. This section briefly locates this 
position in the contemporary context. The following section 
reviews Tani and colleagues’ neurorobotics research aimed 
at understanding consciousness with a focus on the notion 
of criticality, and how incoherence and the breakdown of 
established and anticipated patterns opens a privileged 
view on the emergent self and consciousness thereof. The 
third section delineates formal consciousness in terms of 
three necessary factors present in Tani and colleagues’ 
work yet absent in others, and the fourth section forecasts 
that synthetic neurorobotics will play an increasingly central 
role in consciousness studies going forward.
At the turn of the last century, John Searle found the problem 
of consciousness the most pressing open to biological 
inquiry and explanation. He faulted assumptions that 
the rejection of either dualism or materialism compelled 
the adoption of the other, and championed biological 
naturalism as an alternative. He wrote:
We know enough about how the world works 
to know that consciousness is a biological 
phenomenon caused by brain processes and 
realized in the structure of the brain. It is irreducible 
not because it is ineffable or mysterious, but 
because it has a first-person ontology and 
therefore cannot be reduced to phenomena with a 
third-person ontology.3
This distinction between first and third person ontologies 
helps to frame the hard problem of consciousness, which 
for students of artificial consciousness is perhaps most 
clear in Searle’s distinction between semantics and syntax. 
A machine performs syntactical operations while human 
beings (conscious) do something more, they understand, a 
point originally illustrated in Searle’s famous Chinese Room 
thought experiment.4
Searle’s Chinese room is an argument against reductive 
physicalism, and equally against the notion that 
consciousness is software running on hardware as in 
a modern digital computer. It illustrates that there is 
something missing in the mere exchange of symbols at 
which computers are so proficient, and casts doubt on how 
a “Turing test” might confirm consciousness. After all, the 
“imitation game” was not originally conceived of as a test 
for consciousness, but rather as a test for the ascription of 
intelligence. The question was “Can machines think?” and 
more importantly, can thinking machines be indiscernible 
from human beings in doing so?5
On Searle’s understanding, computational hardware 
pushes symbols according to a program.6 Computers do 
not evolve in material interaction with a pervasive natural 
world, as do human beings, and do not become conscious 
through this interaction. They are not autonomous; they are 
programmed. The best that such a machine can do is to 
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behavior” approximating biological activity patterns “while 
lacking subjective experience” at the same time.26
In summary, Goertzel’s “reasonable approximation” might 
open the door to the Chinese room, but as zombie patterns 
should be indiscernible from non-zombie patterns, what 
greets us may be a zombie. For the patternist, this may not 
be a problem. Goertzel’s goal is passing a Turing Test for 
which a reasonable approximation may suffice. But, when 
it comes to confirmation of consciousness in an artifact, 
it clearly does not, as captured in the concern that we 
may build a system “behaviourally indistinguishable from 
us, and certainly capable of passing the Turing test” that 
remains a “perfect” zombie at the same time.27
In 2009, Jun Tani noted a similar limitation in existing 
examples of machine intelligence such as behavior-based 
robotics articulating sensory-motor reflex behaviors. On his 
assay, systems aimed at passing the Turing test “turn out to 
be just machines having stochastic state transition tables” 
and
after a while, we may begin to feel that the robots 
with reflex behaviors are simply like steel balls in 
pinball machines, repeatedly bouncing against the 
pins until they finally disappear down the holes.28
Further, Tani asks,
But what is wrong with these robots? Although they 
have neither complex skills for action nor complex 
concepts for conversation, such complexity issues 
may not be the main problem.29
Instead, Tani argues that “the problem originates from a 
fundamental lack of phenomenological constructs in those 
robotic agents” and that “[i]n particular, what is missing …
[is] . . . the “subjectivity” that should direct their intentionality 
to project their own particular images on the outer 
objective world.”30 He goes on to suggest that subjectivity 
develops gradually through sensorimotor experience of an 
agent’s direct interaction with the world.31 As each robot 
is distinctly located in a shared space of action in terms 
of a shared objective world, each robot develops its own 
views as particular internal models that then enable it to 
anticipate and to interpret the outcomes of its actions, with 
moreover this shared metric space grounding a capacity to 
generalize these internal constructs in the communication 
with and interpretation of others similarly situated (see the 
second paper in this series for in-depth review).
Consider this issue in terms of identifying agency, as set 
out by Barandiaran, Di Paolo, and Rohde.32 They consider 
that a necessary condition for agency is a system capable of 
defining its own identity as an individual, thus distinguishing 
itself from its surroundings including other agents. Of 
particular interest here is their view that the boundary of 
an individual is self-defined through interaction with the 
environment. Tani argues that the same dynamic grounds 
the emergence of subjectivity in the following way.33
Top-down anticipation may not correlate with perceived 
reality in many situations. When environmental interactions 
integration over discriminable states which “may expand, 
shrink and even move within a given brain depending on 
various conditions.”20 Thus, the IIT continues in Searle’s line 
of reasoning.
Contrast the view put forward by leading commercial 
roboticist Theodore Goertzel. Goertzel does not aim to 
duplicate but rather at a “reasonable approximation” of three 
persistent aspects of consciousness, “free will, reflective 
consciousness” and “phenomenal self.” What is “important” 
for Goertzel is “to identify the patterns constituting a given 
phenomenon” and trace “the relationships between various 
qualities that these patterns are hypothesized to possess 
(experiential versus physical),” an approach reinforced by 
the observation that “from the point of view of studying 
brains, building AI systems or conducting our everyday 
lives, it is generally the patterns (and their subpatterns) that 
matter” with given phenomena “understood” as correlate 
activity patterns are identified.21
Goertzel’s “patternism” is appealing. It is consistent with 
calls for the qualification of artificial systems by biological 
activity. Furthermore, the focal shift from neural loci to 
activity patterns coincides with advancing inquiry into 
biological substrates of consciousness, as current imaging 
technologies afford the establishment of functional 
correlations between networked neural dynamics in 
biological models and self-reports of various aspects of 
consciousness. In light of such advancing research for 
example, Searle’s “already conscious” can be re-assessed 
in terms of the resting state “default” network based in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate 
cortex.22 Heine et al. affirm the promise in interpreting the 
conditions of non-communicating subjects through the 
lens of such activity patterns, a lens that may be repurposed 
in the evaluation of artificial agents of appropriate 
architectures which also may not self-report and indeed 
may not interact with the external world as we know 
it.23 Such patterns can be then mapped onto Goertzel’s 
freewill, reflective consciousness and phenomenal self, 
underscoring the potential of this approach in evaluating 
non-biological systems in similar terms.
However, there remain doubts that consciousness is realized 
in duplicate activity patterns, alone. For example, Oizumi et 
al. characterize patterns of activity internal to the cognitive 
agent in terms of “shapes” in “concept” and “phenomenal 
space” exported as graphical representations, at the same 
time warning that “one needs to investigate not just ‘‘what’’ 
functions are being performed by a system, but also ‘‘how’’ 
they are performed within the system.”24 On the IIT, it is the 
integration over discernible system states that is essential 
to consciousness, with “strong” integrated systems 
autonomous as they act and react from internally composed 
states and goals.25 On this account, pattern matching alone 
does not achieve the strong integration that IIT demands. 
For one, patterns are not necessarily “strongly” integrated, 
i.e., fully embodied and constrained by the possible futures 
that this embodiment affords, i.e., maximally irreducible 
intrinsically. Furthermore, without such strong integration, 
there is no experience. Accordingly, overt focus on 
patterns—“what”—exclusive of how (and why) they arise 
opens the door to “true” zombies exhibiting “input output 
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colleagues are able to expose these dynamics and their 
relation to consciousness, a brief review of the free energy 
principle and its role in the emergence of the phenomenon 
of self is required. From this review, we will be in a position 
to better appreciate Tani’s thesis on the emergence of self 
and consciousness, and its implication that the free energy 
principle, as with activity patterns and strong integration, 
cannot by themselves account for consciousness.
In the second paper, we reviewed Karl Friston’s “free 
energy principle” by which an agent aims to minimize 
error (or “surprise”) by maximizing the likelihood of its own 
predictive models. This approach extends natural processes 
and the energetics that characterize them into the sphere 
of cognitive systems consistent with other theses on 
the nature of cognition, from Helmholtz’s unconscious 
inference to contemporary deep learning. Friston writes that 
“the time-average of free energy” “is simply called “action” 
in physics” and that “the free-energy principle is nothing 
more than principle of least action, applied to information 
theory.”39 “The free-energy principle simply gathers these 
ideas together and summarizes their imperative in terms 
of minimizing free energy (or surprise)” while also bringing 
“something else to the table . . . that action should also 
minimize free energy” putting researchers “in a position 
to consider behavior and self-organization” on the same 
basis.40
On this account familiar by now, agents reflect the 
environments in terms of which they are situated, with the 
dynamics of the world outside reflected in the structures 
inside of the input-output system at the center of which 
is the brain. Friston’s thesis is that the brain works to 
maximize evidence for the model of the world which it 
embodies by acting on that evidence and testing it(self) 
against the perceptual reality. In minimizing surprise, the 
agent maximizes model likelihood to the point where 
endpoints of action are fully determined. This is to raise 
the question of why any agent would ever leave the safety 
of a fully determined situation at the risk of being surprised 
in the transition and suffering undue allostatic load, risking 
complete disintegration, a question addressed in terms 
of the “dark room problem.” Briefly, given a sufficiently 
complex environment, the agent ventures forth because 
increasing information increases control in the long run 
such that opportunities to explore and to exploit new 
information add to the value of a given situation.41 So as to 
why an agent might take risks, even seek them, it does so 
to maintain system integrity, so that the system does not 
dissipate in the face of entropic forces, and seeking—even 
creating—situations which best deliver security in the face 
of uncertainty: “the whole point of the free-energy principle 
is to unify all adaptive autopoietic and self-organizing 
behavior under one simple imperative; avoid surprises and 
you will last longer.”42
Consider the free-energy principle in the context of 
consciousness and minimal self. In a recent review of the 
field, Limanowski and Blankenburg trace the “minimal self” 
and its characteristic sense of mineness and ownership that 
we found at the heart of h-consciousness in our first paper 
through the early phenomenology of the twentieth century 
and in the form of a “self-model.” On this view, “the agent 
proceed exactly as expected, behaviors can be generated 
smoothly and automatically. However, anticipation can 
sometimes be wrong, and the conflict that arises in such 
cases can make generating successive acts difficult. 
When environmental interactions cause the agent to shift 
spontaneously between opposite poles, from automaticity 
to conflict necessitating autonomy, the boundary between 
the subjective mind and the objective world fluctuates, and 
so the boundaries of self are realized. Here, Tani argues 
that the essential characteristics of this phenomenon are 
best understood in terms of traditional phenomenology, 
since phenomenologists have already investigated the 
first-personal characteristics of autonomous and authentic 
selves.34 In the end, Tani expects that uncovering the 
mechanisms grounding autonomy will lead to understanding 
the dynamic structure essential to consciousness in terms 
consistent with those postulated by William James,35 in 
terms of momentary selves in the stream of consciousness. 
The next section reviews Tani and colleagues’ work in 
clarifying these mechanisms and the dynamics essential to 
self and consciousness that they reveal.
2. ANSWERING THE DOOR OF THE CHINESE 
ROOM
Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the 
constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for 
different aspects of agency experience, such 
as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in 
controlling it, or the achievement of the desired 
effect, can be accounted for by processes involved 
in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that 
enables these interactions with the world.
– Buhrmann and Di Paolo36
How is consciousness to be assessed if not through a Turing 
test or via correlation with biological activity patterns? 
Paraphrasing Searle, approximations cannot be conscious. 
What about self-reports, then? “In neuroscience, the ability 
to report is usually considered as the gold standard for 
assessing the presence of consciousness.”37 Reporting on 
internal processes is prima facie evidence for the feeling of 
undergoing them. But again, this is no more a guarantee of 
consciousness than a Turing test, at once neglecting those 
systems unable to so report.
In the first paper, we made the case that computational 
models open consciousness to inspection where study of 
biological models alone cannot. We characterized these 
systems and their transitions in terms of predictive coding 
which aims at minimizing error by optimizing internal 
models guiding action, in biological models understood 
in terms of the “predictive brain.”38 In general terms, 
cognition manages transitions between situations by 
internalizing their dynamics, modeling their likelihoods, 
and preparing for them accordingly with the aim being 
the minimization of error in this process. Tani’s thesis 
is that, where model and reality diverge and error is not 
minimal, consciousness arises in the effort of minimizing 
the difference by modifying the contextual state that the 
agent extends from the past in order to return to coherence 
with its situation. Before proceeding to show how Tani and 
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consciousness is not a stable construct (like an “I”) but 
appears during periods of relative instability through the 
circular causality developed among subjective mind, body, 
and environment. This circular causality cannot be captured 
in neural activity patterns alone, especially where these 
patterns are disrupted, and it cannot be expressed in terms 
of integration, as it is in disintegration and reintegration that 
consciousness emerges. Moreover, it cannot be captured 
in objective descriptions of “mineness” and of ownership 
of agency, as it is only for the agent itself that these 
descriptions are ultimately significant. Finally, as we shall 
argue in the next section, this is why synthetic neurorobotic 
experiments are necessary to access the essential structure 
of consciousness, as they offer a privileged perspective 
on the development of internal dynamics that ultimately 
ground the generalization and self-report of experience. 
Tani summarizes the findings of three neurorobotic 
experiments in terms of three levels of self roughly 
coincident with O’Regan’s, namely “minimal self, social self, 
and self-referential self.” The first accounts for appearances 
of minimal selves in a simple robot navigation experiment, 
the second for appearances of social selves in an imitation 
learning experiment between robots and human subjects, 
and the third for appearances of self-referential selves in 
a more complex skill learning experiment. The following 
review of these results will put us in a position to appreciate 
Tani’s central thesis regarding the role of criticality in 
the emergence of self and consciousness, as well as the 
importance of formal consciousness as set out in the next 
section.
In Experiment 1, interaction between the bottom-up 
pathway of perception and the top-down pathway of its 
prediction was mediated by internal parameters which 
adapted by way of prediction error.50 System dynamics 
proceeded through the incremental learning process by 
intermittently shifting between coherent phases with 
high predictability and incoherent phases with poor 
predictability. Recalling Heidegger’s famous analysis of the 
hammer as its failure reveals its unconscious yet skilled 
employment, consciousness arises with the minimal self as 
the gap is generated between top-down anticipation and 
bottom-up perceived reality during incoherent periods.51
Interestingly in this experiment, system dynamics proceeded 
toward a critical state characterized by a relatively high 
potential for a large range of fluctuations, and so to a 
relatively high potential for incoherency, analogous to the 
self-organized criticality (SOC) of Bak et al.52 Tani speculated 
that SOC emerges when circular causality develops 
among neural processes as body dynamics act on the 
environment and then the body receives the reaction from 
the environment, with system level-dynamics emerging 
from mutual interactions between multiple local processes 
and the external world. During the first experiment for 
example, changes in visual attention dynamics due to 
changes in environmental predictability caused drifts in the 
robot’s maneuvers. These drifts resulted in misrecognition 
of upcoming landmarks, which led to modification of 
the dynamic memory stored in the RNN, affecting later 
environmental predictability. Dynamic interactions took 
place as chain reactions with certain delays among the 
is the current embodied model of the world.”43 And as 
with Merleau-Ponty’s “body-schema,”44 minimal selfhood 
and the feeling that comes with it arises as a whole, with 
prediction of incoming sensory input and its influence on 
all levels of the self-model at once. The sense of mineness 
is thus “always implicit in the flow of information within 
the hierarchical generative self-model”—echoing Friston—
“experienced for actions and perceptions in the same 
way.” Accordingly, self is “not a static representation” 
but “the result of an ongoing, dynamic process” with the 
mineness most characteristic of consciousness “situated 
in a spatiotemporal reference frame where prediction 
introduces the temporal component of “being already 
familiar” with the predicted input.”45 Surprise, thus, is its 
natural complement, indicating subjective failure rather 
than merely objectively bad information.
Similarly, O’Regan develops the view that feelings derive 
from sensorimotor interaction with the environment. So 
long as there is interaction, then there is something that 
it is like to be so interacting, with consciousness arising 
as an agent “with a self” has “conscious access to the 
ongoing sensorimotor interaction.”46 He distinguishes 
three levels of self in terms of which artificial agents may 
be evaluated. First, the agent “distinguishes itself from 
the outside world.” Second, “self-knowledge” expresses 
“purposeful behavior, planning and even a degree of 
reasoning.” And, the third level is “knowledge of self-
knowledge”—i.e., Goertzel’s “reflective consciousness”—
heretofore a “human capability, though some primates and 
possibly dogs, dolphins and elephants may have it to some 
extent.”47 O’Regan is optimistic that all three levels can be 
instantiated in AI. The question remains, how?48
On O’Regan’s analysis, self is maintained under social forces 
which stabilize it as a construct, existing as a convenient 
figment like money. On his account, without the presumed 
value of money, the financial economy would fail and 
similar would hold for society in general should the value 
of “I” be doubted. People traffic in selves, in identities, 
because without it social order would disintegrate, i.e. 
surprise would not be minimized:
Like the cognitive aspect of the self, the sense of 
“I” is a kind of abstraction that we can envisage 
would emerge once an agent, biological or non-
biological, has sufficient cognitive capacities and 
is immersed in a society where such a notion 
would be useful.49
This “I” becomes useful when it relates personal experiences 
with others similarly situated, trading in information about 
what is worth having information about through the 
generalization of the self. This is a long way from pattern 
approximation, and farther away from identifying neural 
correlates with consciousness and self. 
O’Regan’s “I” captures the ubiquity of the self-model, but 
it fails to deliver just how this self-model comes to be 
constructed. What is missing is access to the dynamics that 
drive the formation of the self-model from the subjective 
perspective. This is because the structure of consciousness 
appears as only emergent phenomena. The idea is that 
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susceptible to unexpected perturbations, such as when an 
object is suddenly moved. Such perturbations could initiate 
critical situations. Due to the online nature of behavior 
generation, if the top-down expectations of PB values 
conflict with those from bottom-up regression, the PB vector 
can become fragmented. Even during this fragmentation, 
the robot continues to generate behaviors,but in an 
abnormal manner due to the distortion of the vector. The 
regression of this sort of abnormal experience causes 
further modulation of the current PB vector in a recursive 
way. During this iteration within the causal loop, the entire 
system may face intrinsic criticality from which a diversity 
of behaviors originates. And ultimately, this supports the 
contention that genuine constructs of self-referential selves 
appear with criticality through conflictive interactions in the 
circular causality of the top-down subjective mind and the 
bottom-up perceptual reality.
In summary, the three types of selves articulated above 
differ from each other, but more importantly they also 
share a similar condition of self-organized criticality that 
emerges in dynamic interaction between bottom-up and 
top-down processes. This condition cannot be accounted 
for by merely monotonic processes of prediction error 
minimization or free-energy, because such processes 
simply converge into equilibrium states (again, the dark 
room problem). Consciousness, and with it autonomy 
and the self cannot be explained in terms of convergent 
dynamics, but by ongoing open dynamics characterized 
by circular causality involving top-down prediction and 
bottom-up error regression, body dynamics acting on 
the environment and the reaction dynamics from the 
environment. Finally, in distinction from other research 
programs, Tani and colleagues’ synthetic neurorobotics 
experiments are specifically designed to articulate these 
dynamics in a way that amounts to formal consciousness, 
as set out in the following section.
Recently, Tani examined free will arising from this open 
structure of consciousness by extending an MTRNN 
model to a scenario involving incremental interactive 
tutoring.55 When taught a set of movement sequences, 
the robot generated various images as well as actions by 
spontaneously combining these sequences.56 As the robot 
generated such actions, Tani occasionally interacted with 
the robot in order to modify its on-going movement by 
grasping its hands. During these interactions, the robot 
would spontaneously initiate an unexpected movement 
which Tani identified with an expression of free will. When 
Tani corrected the hand movement, the robot would 
respond by moving in yet a different way. Because the 
reaction forces generated between the robot’s hands and 
Tani’s hands were transformed into an error signal in the 
MTRNN, with its internal neural state modified through the 
resultant error regression, novel patterns were more likely 
to be generated when the robot was in conflict with the 
perceptual reality. The enactment of such novel intentions, 
experienced successively, induces further modification of 
the memory structure grounding further intention. Intentions 
for a variety of novel actions can thus be generated from 
such memory structures. And in this way, this experiment is 
able to isolate those dynamics grounding the emergence 
of free will in a synthetic neurorobotic agent.
processes of recognition, prediction, perception, learning, 
and acting, reflecting the circular causality between the 
subjective mind and the objective world. This circular 
causality provides for self-organized criticality. By developing 
this structure, breakdown to an incoherent phase proceeds 
only intermittently rather than all-or-nothing (similarly, the 
IIT). At the same time, Tani’s thesis is that the self appears 
as momentary in these periods. In this way, this experiment 
was uniquely able to access the structure of consciousness 
as it affords a privileged view on the transition through 
meta-stable and unstable states to relatively stable states 
in terms of which automatic, unconscious, though perhaps 
skilled agency is regained.
Experiment 2 extended this research, exploring 
characteristics of selves in a social context through an 
imitation game between a humanoid robot controlled by the 
RNNPB and human subjects. The RNNPB is characterized by 
its simultaneous processes of prediction and regression.53 
In the middle of the mutual imitation game, analogous to 
Experiment 1 above, the RNNPB spontaneously shifted 
between coherence and incoherence. Tani and colleagues 
surmised that such complexity may appear at a certain 
critical period in the course of developmental learning 
processes in human subjects, when an adequate balance 
between predictability and unpredictability is achieved. 
Contrary to the image of a pinball simply following the 
paths of natural (nonliving) systems, human subjects 
may perceive robots as autonomous selves when these 
robots participate in interactive dynamics with criticality, as 
they actively self-determine possible ends and then test 
themselves in embodied action toward or away from them, 
pushing at the boundaries of the known and unknown in 
ways that other machines do not.
Experiment 3 addressed the problem of self-referential 
selves, i.e., does the robot have a sense that things 
might have been otherwise? Here, the RNNPB model 
was extended with hierarchy and as a neurorobotic arm 
manipulated an object, the continuous sensorimotor 
flow was segmented into reusable behavior primitives 
by stepwise shifts in the PB vector due to prediction 
error. Then, the higher level RNN learned to predict the 
sequences of behavior primitives in terms of shifts in this 
vector. Tani and colleagues interpreted the development of 
these dynamics as the process of achieving self-reference, 
because the sensorimotor flow is objectified into reusable 
units which are then manipulated in the higher level. When 
the sensorimotor flow is recomposed of such segments, it 
becomes a series of consciously describable objects rather 
than merely transitions between system states, a dynamic 
that may begin to account for how self-referential selves 
are constituted, such as when one takes an objective view 
of one’s self as one “life story” among others.
That said, such constructs arising in this hierarchical 
RNNPB research cannot fully account for structures of 
self-referential selves. They are constituted in a static 
way, along a one-directional bottom-up path. Incidentally, 
experimental results using the same model regarding 
online plan modulation demonstrate how genuinely self-
referential selves may be constituted.54 These suggest that 
the sequencing of primitives in the higher level can become 
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The preceding discussion shows that consciousness can 
be accessed by open dynamics where integration and 
breakdown are repeated during the exercise of agency in a 
changing world. Once again, pattern matching cannot afford 
such an insight, and in contrast with the IIT, consciousness 
appears when integrative dynamics break down. The 
essential structure of consciousness is the structure of 
autonomous agency simply put, a result that prepares us to 
appreciate the advance that Tani and colleagues’ synthetic 
neurorobots represent in terms of formal consciousness in 
the following section.
3. INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
What the soul nourishes by is of two types—just as 
what we steer by is both the hand and the rudder: 
the first both initiates motion and undergoes it, 
and the second simply undergoes it. 
– Aristotle59
Where the IIT holds that integration is essential to 
consciousness, with the integrative structure determining 
the phenomenal content of consciousness, and with “strong” 
integrated systems autonomous as they act and react from 
internally composed states and goals, Tani and colleagues’ 
synthetic neurorobotic experiments show us how these 
goals are composed and why autonomy is necessary, in 
transitioning through critical periods toward relatively 
stable interactive states. This is a long way from where we 
began, at the door of Searle’s Chinese room. And, it is in 
light of this advance that we wish to distinguish between 
“simulations” or “approximations” of consciousness and 
what we call “formal consciousness” instead, specifically 
in order to recognize Tani and colleagues’ neurorobots as 
examples of the latter.
In Searle’s Chinese room, there is an implicit interpretation 
of how AI works, what it does and how it does it, an 
interpretation that doesn’t capture the essence of 
the neurorobots reviewed in this series of papers. His 
distinction between syntax and semantics is perhaps best 
understood to researchers in AI in terms of Steven Harnad’s 
famous “symbol grounding problem,”60 with much work in 
the direction of solving it since.61 Let’s reassess Searle’s 
presumptions to better locate where we currently stand 
in the inquiry. Instead of merely matching incoming with 
outgoing symbols, the model agents reviewed in this series 
of papers anticipate input by forming appropriate output of 
its own prior experience, with the difference being used 
to refine that capacity going forward. This involves more 
than “input output behavior” as each input is transformed 
into something with strictly internal significance before 
output as something else with general significance. This is 
to say that the model develops its own private language, 
a phenomenon receiving recent popular attention in the 
context of AI62 but which has been a long-standing point 
of interest in human beings.63 This private language may 
be represented in terms of “patterns” and “shapes” but 
not directly, only after having been generalized and with 
the loss of the uniqueness that characterizes the deepest 
of human memories, so-called “flashbulb” memories for 
example. Still, a shared metric space mediated by common 
external objects grounds even these uniquely self-defining 
In brief, the picture that emerges is that of a circular 
causality involving (1) spontaneous generation of intentions 
with various proactive actional images developed from 
the memory structure, (2) enactment of those actional 
images in reality, (3) conscious experience of the outcome 
of the interaction, (4) incremental learning of these new 
experiences and the resultant reconstruction in the 
memory structure.57 Diverse images, actions and thoughts 
are potentially generated as the agent spontaneously 
shifts between conscious (“incoherent”) and unconscious 
(“coherent”) states with repeated confrontation and 
reconciliation between the subjective mind and the 
objective world. And summarily, free will as evidenced in 
the spontaneous generation of novel intention potentially 
arises as an open dynamic structure emerges through 
circular causality.
With this we see that self-reflective consciousness 
corresponding with O’Regan’s third level may arise as 
an agent capable of revising intentions does so in order 
to meet a projected future situation according to self-
determined plans to achieve it, in part by modulating its 
own agency by adopting predetermined or more reactive 
internal dynamics.58 The ultimate question about the origins 
of an autonomous self becomes how subjective experience 
of continuous sensorimotor flow can be transformed into 
manipulable objects, memories and possibilities in terms 
of which self is both experienced and characterized. As 
the pure sensorimotor flow is segmented into identifiable 
objects, the flow in its original form becomes manipulable, 
and in its objectification becomes also generalized into 
an “I” stabilized through discourse with others similarly 
situated. Thus, Tani and colleagues’ synthetic neurorobotics 
experiments have been able to isolate essential dynamics 
indicating self-organization through criticality to be the key 
mechanism driving the constitution of self-referential selves.
Our position is that self-referential selves emerge through 
self-organizing mechanisms involving the assembly 
and disassembly of sensorimotor schemata of repeated 
experiences, resulting in the construction of “self-
models” or “body schemes” through internal dynamics. 
Most importantly, these arise only in critical conditions 
of sustaining conflictive and effortful interactions 
between the top-down subjective mind and the bottom-
up sensorimotor reality at the level of agency. We cannot 
access consciousness in terms of a monotonic process of 
integration, error or free energy minimization, any more than 
through pattern matching and neural correlate tracking. 
For one thing, the ultimate aim of integrative dynamics 
is the “oneness with the world” which would characterize 
action without error within it. The result of this error free 
condition would, paradoxically by the present account, 
be consciousness of nothing at all. Rather, it is during 
purposeful conflict with the world that agent autonomy is 
exercised and self-consciousness arises, as it is against the 
silent standard of a perfect fit with project situations that an 
agent is held to account in inner reflection and correction of 
error. And moreover, it is due the structure of agency itself 
that the agent inherits from itself its own next situation at 
the end of each action, thereby cementing the “mineness” 
of h-consciousness that eludes being pinned down to any 
local neural correlate.
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models afford such insight, either. Only those designed to 
do so are able, instances of formal consciousness rather 
than something bent to a different end.
4. MOST- AND MYTH-CONSCIOUSNESS
There is an originating and all-comprehending 
(principle) in my words, and an authoritative law 
for the things (which I enforce). It is because they 
do not know these, that men do not know me. 
– Tao te Ching, chapter 70, passage 2
Finally, we conclude with a short note on most- and myth-
consciousness. Space forbids full exploration of this 
distinction, and in order to emphasize the role of criticality 
and incoherence in revealing the essential structure of 
consciousness, the following focuses on the promise for 
the current approach to formalize even the highest levels 
of human consciousness by way of dynamics common to 
the most basic. 
There is precedent for distinction between levels of 
consciousness. For example, Gallagher distinguishes 
between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness in 
terms of minimal and “narrative” self.67 Roughly in the 
first, an agent is aware of what it is undergoing, and in the 
second it recognizes such as episodic within the context of 
a “life story.” The first is immediate though with an implicit 
sense of ownership, the “mineness” of h-consciousness 
as discussed in our first paper. The second is temporally 
extended, with episodes composed into stories that human 
beings tell about themselves and that come to define the 
self as fundamentally narrative in the strongest theories of 
narrative self. These can be mapped onto most- and myth-
consciousness, with differences serving to clarify the point 
of the present distinction. 
Most-consciousness corresponds with what IIT describes 
as the integration across differentiable system states, as in 
before and after the lights are turned on in a room. The felt 
difference between the two situations reveals the room. In 
so far as action proceeds according to expectation, there 
may be little in the sense of most-consciousness as in Tani’s 
favorite example, making coffee without awareness of the 
process until after completion, when sitting with hot cup in 
hand reflecting on one’s own apparent zombie-like activity 
and perhaps without capacity to self-report on the series 
of movements in between beyond prior generalization. 
This position is in concert with the phenomenological 
grounds of Gallagher’s (2000) account of pre-reflective 
consciousness and its contrast with higher-order theories of 
consciousness on which consciousness arises with higher-
order objectification of pre-reflective experience.68 In terms 
of the neurorobots discussed in this series of papers, 
most-consciousness presents in the incoherence between 
predicted and perceived reality, for example when spilling 
the milk or dropping the spoon along the way, and includes 
the objectification of the movement that led to the mistake.
Most consciousness accounts for much, but it is not 
complete. To completely describe the feeling of what it is 
to be a self in a maximal sense, rather than in a minimal 
sense, we must describe what it feels like to generalize 
memories in similar terms for those similarly situated, thus 
grounding generalization to common terms and facile 
communication of the significance of internal states so 
articulated.64
However, both private language and symbol grounding in a 
shared object environment neglect something fundamental 
to the phenomena of self, consciousness, and freewill, 
this being “how” this private language comes about as its 
limited grounds are exceeded and rediscovered through 
intermittent phases of incoherence. This dynamic has been 
emphasized in the preceding review of Tani and colleagues’ 
neurorobotics. Their research formalizes the internal 
dynamics which not only facilitate translation from one 
grounded symbol to another, but that for example leave a 
human being hanging on a next word in anticipation. It is 
difficult to see how Searle’s argument against first person 
ontology in an AI holds here. And, it is equally difficult to 
see how discovery of neural correlates of consciousness 
alone should reveal this fact. It may well be that conscious 
systems exhibit characteristic patterns in characteristic 
regions, but these may be duplicated without similar 
experience, “true zombies.”
The models reviewed in this series of papers do not aim to 
duplicate neural correlates. Neither do they aim to simulate 
consciousness or to pass a Turing test. Rather, this research 
aims to isolate the essential structural dynamics in the 
normal operations of which certain phenomena arise. We 
refer to this aim as “formal” consciousness in distinction 
from others which aim at “reasonable approximations” 
evidenced in convincing behavior, for example. 
Specifically, we hold that three things are necessary for 
formal consciousness. First and foremost, there is critical 
reconciliation of intention with perceived reality as a 
system moves between relatively stable and unstable 
states, as discussed above.65 This dynamic requires second 
that the system develop a private language which is then 
generalized into common terms through third a common 
grounding in a shared object environment. These three 
factors on the one hand account for unique subjectivity 
arising from otherwise common dynamic structures, while 
at the same time account for how this subjectivity and 
its uniqueness may be generalized in terms significant 
to other agents similarly situated. For human beings, 
this involves internalizing natural system energetics as a 
shared space of action, by way of which subjectivity can 
be “made sense of” by other human beings who are also 
grounded in this same object environment.66 Note that this 
requirement is embodied in human beings as a product 
of evolution, and is captured by the FEP in current formal 
models which—in formal consciousness—stands in for the 
material component of biological consciousness, in this 
way opening the door to “making sense of” the experience 
of synthetic neurorobots in similar terms.
Formal consciousness represents the structural dynamics 
essential to consciousness, while simulated consciousness 
and reasonable approximations of behavior in Turing test 
capable so-called “general” AI need not. Here again, we 
may stress the point made in the first paper—this is a level 
of resolution that is inaccessible through study of biological 
consciousness—with the further caveat that not all synthetic 
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This series of papers made the case for formal consciousness 
in a family of neurorobots isolating dynamics essential to 
consciousness independent of neural correlates. It began 
with naturalistic nonreductionism and with consciousness 
in biological agents, resolving consciousness at the level 
of situated system open to the complex world, centering 
on the thesis that consciousness is a consequence of 
agential systems situated at the cusp of criticality, arising 
not in routine execution but in surprising failure to continue 
in perfect coherence with the world and thereby finding 
themselves out of place within it.
Tani and colleagues’ synthetic neurorobots afford insight 
into the essence of consciousness where other systems 
cannot. They articulate the essence of free agency where 
other systems articulate something else to some other 
end. Finally, we may ask what it is that keeps us from 
understanding that consciousness inheres in such an 
artifact by design, even when confronted with products of 
consciousness at every turn? What is it that stops us from 
recognizing consciousness in an appropriately designed 
model intelligence, much as we recognize chairness in a 
chair, or computation in a computer? We answer that it is only 
our incapacity to recognize the origin of such phenomena 
in ourselves, in the reconciliation of the subjective with the 
objective world. As we reflexively aim for the restoration of 
stable coherency where otherwise there is only suffering, 
uncertainty, and the piercing awareness of it all, we retreat 
from conflict and away from the very object of our inquiry, 
away from consciousness itself. Without the courage to 
meet this struggle with a steady gaze, even with a machine 
articulating the truth of the matter, we fail to see it for what 
it is, formally conscious.
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10. Searle points to Crick and Koch (“Consciousness and 
Neuroscience”) and the notion that the neural correlates for all 
senses—the varied “building blocks of microconsciousnesses”—
are integrated into “any conscious field” and that a science of 
consciousness starts by isolating these and working up (Searle, 
“Consciousness,” 570; see also Crick and Koch, “Constraints 
on Cortical and Thalamic Projections: The No-Strong-Loops 
Hypothesis”). Compare with Driver and Spence: “subjective 
experience within one modality can be dramatically affected by 
stimulation within another” relative to “the presence of feedback 
pathways from convergence zones” such that “brain areas 
the entire self, and not just one part and its possible 
actions. Gallagher attends to a similar phenomenon in the 
condition of “being a novelist” which on his assay involves 
“an enhanced ability for creating/entering into multiple 
realities and staying there longer and more consistently 
. . . without intersubjective support . . . short of dysfunction 
or delusion.”69 The novelist must create not only distinct 
narratives in the form of realistic life stories but also the 
coherent space of their interaction towards, ideally, some 
meaningful resolution. Myth-consciousness corresponds 
with this capacity, a sort of meta-narrative capacity that—on 
the present view—may be consequent on the experience 
of self-alienating criticality, an experience of a distance 
from one’s own self-situation affording the experience of 
one’s own entire self-situation as an object, and with this 
other self-situations as wholes similarly. 
What may cause such deep criticality in a system that its 
subjective entirety may be taken as an object amongst 
others? We have introduced one possibility in the example 
of Aaron Applefield as discussed by Thomas Fuchs (2017) 
in the first paper. Trauma cementing memory “in the 
bones” in conflict with current perceptual reality may 
sustain the subject in the immersion in a perceptual reality 
that demands the “decoupling of conflict monitoring and 
executive control functions” which Gallagher proposes in 
novelists but that also confounds the “ability to re-connect 
and use executive control to come back to the default, 
everyday reality.”70 Such experience is also recognizable 
in the felt difference between one’s present situation and 
that in which there is no self so situated at all, angst,71 
and which Victor Frankl (1985) understood contributes to 
the formation of purpose making the life of action as a 
whole meaningful. Myth-consciousness thus corresponds 
with what Gallagher discusses in terms of “delusion” and 
“dysfunction” understood as the normal function of a being 
aiming for coherence with an otherwise critically unstable 
situation, thereby discovering and indeed becoming the 
self-model of an underlying order that makes the transition 
to a relatively stable state, and the retention of personal 
integrity—even personal redemption—possible. 
Our position is that the neurorobotic experiments reviewed 
in this series of papers formalize most-consciousness, 
and have not been designed for myth-consciousness, 
but are potentially myth-conscious. Currently, system 
criticality arises only at the moment of state instability 
and extends only to those local dimensions. However, 
myth-consciousness may be investigated through similar 
dynamics in an agent exposed to the necessary perceptual 
reality during sufficient personal development, e.g. human 
neoteny. Other approaches to artificial intelligence which 
focus on reproducing stable activity patterns for example 
cannot result in something like myth-consciousness, but it 
is a potential for synthetic neurorobotics as pursued by Tani 
and colleagues as an aspect of future research.
5. CONCLUSION
If you have your why? for life, then you can get 
along with almost any how?
– Nietzsche72
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INTERVIEW
Cognitive Engines Contemplating 
Themselves: A Conversation with 
S. L. Thaler
Stephen L. Thaler




For the past thirty years, Stephen Thaler’s work has been 
in the development of artificial neural networks (ANN). A 
major focus of his work has been to find a way to develop 
creativity within computers in a way that was more organic 
than the human-coded algorithms and rule sets used with 
sequential processing systems.
Thaler works with both less complex ANNs and the more 
sophisticated “Creativity Machines” (CM). ANNs are 
typically “single shot” in that a pattern propagates from 
inputs to outputs somewhat like a spinal cord reflex. They 
crudely model perception. Made recurrent they may serve 
as associative memories. In contrast, CMs are composed of 
multiple ANNs, contemplatively banging around potential 
ideas until an appropriate one is found.
Creativity Machines function via a process involving the 
interaction between two different types of neural networks, 
imagitrons and perceptrons. The imagitrons consist of 
internally perturbed ANNs that harness disturbances to 
their neurons and connections to create variations on 
stored memory patterns, generating potential solutions to 
posed problems. Once detected by unperturbed ANNs, the 
perceptrons, these solutions are reinforced as memories 
that can later be elicited by exciting or “perturbing” the 
imagitron at moderate levels. 
The result of this process is that the imagitrons within CMs 
generate a succession of ideas making them functionally 
contemplative rather than reflexive. A self-monitoring 
aspect then comes from perceptrons “watching” this 
succession and selecting the most appropriate of these 
ideas. There are many internal processes involved, 
including the selective reinforcement of those notions 
having novelty, utility, or value.
The level of perturbation-induced stress to the system 
affects the type of “recall” the system produces. The more 
intense these disturbances within the system, the greater 
the error in reconstructing its stored memories, leading to 
false memories or confabulations. Too much stress causes 
the ANNs to produce too great a variation on reality and 
an eventual cessation of turnover of such candidate ideas. 
However, Thaler could adjust the stress level within the 
system to generate confabulations that were sufficiently 
novel and plausible enough to qualify as viable ideas. Even 
better, he could let other neural nets determine the novelty, 
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In that paper, I reiterated what I have written for decades, 
that the subjective feel of consciousness results from 
the associative chaining of relevant intact and degraded 
memories. As these associative gestalt chains form, an 
attentional spotlight sequentially examines them in the 
same way our brains relive past, related experience. In 
the brain, if such attention falls on ideas or ideational 
sequences having threatening existential significance, 
sundry associative chains encoding fear and dread (e.g., 
homelessness, illness, and death) will form in response. 
Specialized colonies of neurons within these emotional 
chains may, for instance, release the neurotransmitters 
and neuro-hormones associated with fight-or-flight 
response, either heightening cognitive turnover to produce 
alternative ideas, or freezing neural turnover to allow the 
episodic reinforcement of the precipitating ideational 
chain along with the accompanying emotions. Similarly, if 
the ideas expressed in these associative chains potentially 
mitigate a challenge dealt by the environment, other 
neurotransmitters neutralize those associated with stress, 
thus tranquilizing the neural system so that it may reinforce 
such ideas and emotions into memories.
In Creativity Machines, the same effect may be 
achieved by flooding their artificial neural nets with 
mathematical disturbances that are diffusing like 
stress-related neurotransmitter molecules. Such stress 
may be counteracted with the equivalent of reward 
neurotransmitters that trigger even more associative 
gestalts encoding a feeling of success (e.g., memories of 
rainbows, Christmas presents, and sunny days).
KRISTEN: What you’re saying here is that machines are 
much farther along the road to human-like cognition 
and experiences than most people would suspect? If 
machines can perceive, remember, recall memories, 
monitor their recall and internal processes, and have 
subjective experience, then what about the “hard problem 
of consciousness” or “h-consciousness?”
STEVE: In a sense, I think you’ve answered your own 
question, Kristen. Subjective experience stems from 
associative chaining of memories among sundry neural 
modules that then lead to the wholesale secretion of 
neurotransmitters to produce gut-level feelings and 
associated somatic effects. So, artificial neural systems 
may have an emotional response not only to things in the 
external world, but to internally generated ideas.
Although we may come to a generalized model of 
h-consciousness, it does not describe in idiosyncratic detail 
the processes within any given brain. In a general sense, 
though, memories and confabulations chain to express 
both concepts and the affective responses to them, with 
communication between the networks highly encrypted. 
That’s why we cannot eavesdrop on this dialog, because 
the “public decryption key,” if you will, is based upon 
decades of mutual interaction and learning between neural 
nets, making the first-person experience unknowable to 
an outsider. Even the introduction of a synaptic bridge 
between two brains would be futile in allowing either to 
appreciate the other’s first-person perspective because: (1) 
They would interpret each other’s thoughts based upon their 
utility, and/or value of these ideas, using that information in 
turn to meter overall perturbation level in the imagitrons to 
generate novel yet plausible concepts, without any human 
intervention.
There are clear parallels to biological problem-solving in 
Thaler’s work. We are not always driven to find creative 
solutions to problems unless there is some environmental 
or personal stress that drives us. Solutions are only useful if 
they fall within the realm of the practical and are plausible 
variations of our current reality. However, there also seems 
to be an upper limit to the amount of stress under which 
biological organisms can function well, too much of it and 
the individual becomes overwhelmed and non-functional.
Thaler’s work suggests that there are many functional 
parallels between the processes and results of artificial 
neural architectures and biological systems, and we may 
better understand the phenomena of consciousness, 
mental illness, and creativity by examining their behaviors. 
We may also find insights which lead us into a different 
understanding of cognitive processes, their origins and 
limits.
As I read through several of Stephen Thaler’s articles on 
contemplative artificial neural networks, I struggled to 
understand some of the technical details of Thaler’s work, 
and therefore missed the implications entailed. Happily, I 
had the opportunity to correspond with Steve, and ask him 
some questions about his work and the conclusions he has 
reached about it.1 This paper is a summary of some of the 
more interesting points of discussion.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THALER’S WORK 
IN ARTIFICIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The functioning of Thaler’s Creativity Machines involves an 
ongoing two stage process in which the imagitron networks 
first generate outputs that the perceptron networks then 
evaluate. This type of self-monitoring is analogous to 
that found in human cognition. We have experiences and 
thoughts that are both internally generated and evaluated. 
Can the problem of consciousness perhaps be resolved 
using this model? I asked Steve for his thoughts on this.
KRISTEN: Is the main argument in your 2012 paper, The 
Creativity Machine Paradigm: Withstanding the Argument 
from Consciousness,2 that because of the similarities 
in functioning between your patented artificial neural 
systems, and human brains, you have been able to come 
to a new theory of what h-consciousness is, and how it is 
generated?
STEVE: My 2012 APA paper was in defense of Turing’s 
thesis that machines could be humanly intelligent. It 
concentrated on perceptron-imagitron pairs (i.e., Creativity 
Machines) to provide models for how both creativity and 
consciousness could be implemented on computers. 
The issue of h-consciousness arose in this context, in 
describing how artificial neural systems could develop a 
subjective, individualized feel about what its imagitrons 
were thinking.
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stress within the brain, originating from scenarios ranging 
from existential threats to minor challenges to pride. 
Beyond my own investigations, I vaguely remember reading 
research in the popular press in the mid 70s, claiming that 
so-called “risk exercise” (e.g., contact sports, skydiving, 
horseback riding, etc.) seemed to stimulate creative 
cognition. Whereas the ability to take risks is attributed 
to more creative individuals, I see the dousing of cortex 
by molecular species like adrenaline as a major cause of 
original thought. Since the 70s, I’ve seen ample literature 
that advocates regular exercise to stimulate creativity, fitting 
in beautifully with my theory, since one’s vigorous exertions 
would produce associative chains that include thoughts 
of aggression, as in the context of mortal battle or contact 
sports, or standing one’s ground and/or fleeing danger. I 
don’t care where these chains start, but they do inevitably 
contain the neural “trip points” that trigger a deluge of 
stress-related neurotransmitters within cortical networks.
And yes, this trait is the result of evolution. Problem solving 
needs to take place when the organism is challenged or 
stressed, otherwise it ultimately receives the “Darwin 
Award.”
KRISTEN: But environmental stress wouldn’t be the only 
trigger of creativity would it? Couldn’t the process be 
internally triggered by emotional stress, or hormonal 
changes, or some kind of cognitive process?
STEVE: You’re correct, and I suspect that such stress can be 
subdivided into “stimulated” and “spontaneous” categories. 
The emotional stress can be externally generated by events 
in the external environment such as work pressures (i.e., 
stimulated) or driven by internally generated scenarios such 
as nightmares (i.e., spontaneous) resulting from pattern 
completion upon synaptic noise. Hormonal changes would 
fall into the latter spontaneous category.
Note that in my model of mind, the stress amounts to 
an excess of excitatory or inhibitory neurotransmitters 
and/or neuro-hormones. So, I’m talking strictly about the 
physical and chemical events that may or may not have an 
environmental cause
KRISTEN: Some of your work suggests that consciousness 
may not be limited to biological beings, but rather exist in 
ways and places that might surprise us.  Could you tell me 
more about this and how it could be possible?
STEVE: Without launching into a long dissertation, Creativity 
Machines consist of energetically stimulated neural nets that 
generate streams of activation patterns consisting of both 
true and false memories, as other neural nets seize upon 
those activation patterns and sequences having novelty, 
utility, or value. Note that in the physical, non-biological 
universe, many things act like neurons, switching between 
states due to inputs from other such switching elements. 
Connections are implemented via physical forces.3
So, consider two regions of space (or even space-time) 
consisting of such switching elements, exchanging patterns 
between one another and nudging each other via energetic 
own idiosyncratic experience; and (2) They would perturb 
the very neurobiology they were monitoring in a manner 
reminiscent of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
KRISTEN: This would explain the process that results in a 
privileged access of machine consciousness paralleling 
that of human or animal cognition and experience. 
STEVE: Yes. You and I represent two neural systems 
communicating via some relatively small number of 
channels (i.e., sight and sound). If we knew each other on 
a day-to-day basis, we could look at the same objects and 
scenarios and learn to intuitively anticipate one another’s 
thoughts. That would be our own mutual, albeit limited, 
privileged access.
The same process occurs between different portions of the 
brain, with oh so many more communication channels. 
KRISTEN: This adds in the subjectivity of biologically 
produced thought as well. In some ways, the world is 
always “the world as I see it, or the world as I believe it to 
be.” How strange to think that this same subjectivity would 
apply to artificial intelligence as well. 
STEVE: Actually, I don’t think it that strange. In the brain, the 
utility or value of anything cannot be calculated by objective 
numerical values. That would take far more than the 100 
billion or so neurons of the brain and require prohibitively 
long periods of training. So, instead, human neurobiology 
computes a subjective response by imagining how the 
world could unfold as the result of any perceived event or 
internally generated idea, essentially a chain of true and 
false memories that are unique to the individual. Some of 
the neural nets containing the more existentially important 
of these memories serve as triggers for generalized 
neurotransmitter release (e.g., adrenaline or dopamine 
surges) that in turn produce other feelings that cannot be 
expressed via natural language. 
In machine intelligence, we inevitably face the same 
limitations, especially regarding the total number of 
processors and connections. Note however that machines 
will not have the same subjective experience as humans, 
since their experiences with the world are very different. 
KRISTEN: Does any psychological research support your 
idea that it is when a biological creature is stressed that it 
is most capable of creative thought? (Is this trait the result 
of evolution?)
STEVE: Probably the best evidence has come from my own 
cognitive research in which I present human volunteers with 
cognitive tasks of varying difficulty. As would be expected, 
the more challenging creative tasks result in a slower 
and more sporadic delivery of ideas. Of course, common 
sense and high-level psychology would dictate that such 
a tentative ideational rhythm stems from the inherent 
difficulty of a cognitive task. In contrast, my CM-based 
models demonstrate that up to a limit, novelty of thought 
increases with global neurotransmitter levels. Generated by 
the formation of positive or negative associative gestalts, 
such excess neurotransmitters are the manifestations of 
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to just the connections and processing elements of 
imagitrons, and not those of the perceptrons. In the brain, 
however, there are no barriers between generative and 
evaluating neural nets, so disturbances are indiscriminately 
applied to both types of nets. The problem is that generative 
nets perform well when internally perturbed, but the 
critic nets malfunction under these conditions, producing 
incorrect assessments of the generated ideas. On the 
other hand, in the absence of perturbation, the critics are 
more accurate, but the generative nets produce unoriginal 
ideas. So, the brain must toggle between these two 
noise extremes, with imagitrons incubating ideas during 
heightened perturbation, and their evaluation performed 
by perceptrons during calmer phases. 
But the interesting part of this cycling process is that the 
stress the brain is under affects it globally rather than 
locally. This may lead to sweeping conceptual changes 
within it that alter underlying assumptions and beliefs.
KRISTEN: Could you explain how the creative cycles you 
observe within your ANN may translate to biological brains 
and behavior—and what we might label “mental illness?” 
STEVE: I probably need a good twenty pages to respond 
to this question, but here’s a summary. Ideas form as well-
habituated primitive concepts stored within neural nets 
chain together via synaptic connections and then blend. 
Likewise, the predicted consequences and emotional 
response take the form of associative chains linked by 
synaptic connections. Too few synaptic perturbations (i.e., 
neurotransmitters) and there is little turnover of ideational 
chains and the system is cognitively dysfunctional. Too 
many synaptic perturbations and the turnover of response 
chains is significantly slowed or stalled, leading to a 
similar cognitive paralysis. The implication is that there 
is a “Goldilocks zone” in synaptic perturbation wherein 
ideas are just “twisted” and plentiful enough to produce 
plausible ideas and the response chains, or perceptions of 
such candidate ideas are still accurate enough to accurately 
predict the consequences of said ideational chains. It is 
within this narrow window of synaptic perturbation that 
subliminally formed ideas are recognized for their merit by 
an intact perceptual system.
You ask what is “mental illness?” At first, I am inundated 
with my own associative gestalts, images of people 
in straightjackets, padded cells, imaginary six-foot-tall 
rabbits, and electro-convulsive therapy. I think that similar 
associative gestalts have become the definition through 
cultural repetition.
Then, as has become the norm, a more comprehensive fiction 
emerges, typically mathematical in nature, namely that our 
brains naturally oscillate between function and dysfunction 
due to tidal variations in volume neurotransmitter level. 
Between these extremes, the brain selects from ideas born 
cumulatively over multiple cycles of this kind.
In the end, it is the less creative among us who 
bureaucratically define insanity and reinforce that definition 
by fiat. In effect those among us who attempt to “fly” are 
typically fingered by the pedestrians among us.
fluctuations. In my mind, these strictly inorganic systems 
are thinking and developing the equivalent of a first-
person perspective of themselves. Yes, most would belittle 
the mere activation patterns being exchanged between 
regions of space-time, as just mathematically expressed 
patterns, but to me they are ideas. Thinking otherwise, 
at least to me, is a form of prejudice against what is the 
most plausible form of spirituality one can imagine, cosmic 
consciousness, the very template from which biological 
consciousness may have arisen.4
KRISTEN: This view of consciousness is radically different 
from the ordinary view that consciousness is mysterious, 
bound up with “personhood” and strictly limited to certain 
types of intelligent biological organisms. It seems, though, 
that if we can think of consciousness as a process, or 
in terms of functions, then once one recognizes those 
patterns in one type of non-biological entity, it is not such 
a leap to consider that consciousness might not only be a 
biological phenomenon. 
One other thing that struck me, as I read your work was 
the individual and subjective perspective in workings of 
the brain or ANN. This subjectivity seems to crystallize in 
the statement: “That radical view stemmed from my own 
epistemology that doesn’t recognize truth or definition.” 
Does this mean that you focus on “what works consistently” 
and “what doesn’t work consistently” rather than “what 
is true or false?”  Or is it more of an acknowledgment of 
the subjectivity of understanding?
STEVE: In my model of mind, there are only associative 
chains that typically close on themselves to form the 
equivalent of circular definitions. So, we never know what 
something is, only what it’s like. Over time, what we call 
“truth” consists of the more reinforced or habituated of 
these gestalt chains. So, rather than express an absolute 
reality, these sequences of tokenized reality capture only 
snippets of the world that either have pragmatic relevance to 
the host organism, or are the most repetitive. Furthermore, 
such consequence chains are finite in extent, so whatever 
“truth” has heretofore nucleated within the brain, the full 
range of its repercussions, including its potential negation, 
have yet to activate. 
As a scientist, I only acknowledge self-consistency and 
speak tongue-in-cheek of “truth.” My hero in this regard 
was Feyerbend who spoke of scientific theories as useful 
myths that have proven predictive value. So, I’m agreeing 
with Feyerabend from the perspective of neurophilosophy.
KRISTEN: I see a little Bergson here, too.
STEVE: . . . and maybe not. I’m not glorifying subjectivity. 
Instead I’m showing the limitations of the human mind, 
which on rare occasions generates highly novel and 
accurate predictive models of the world (e.g., Einstein).
CREATIVITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS
In Thaler’s artificial neural architectures, creative 
confabulations arise primarily when these systems are 
stressed via mathematical disturbances selectively applied 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS
PAGE 26 FALL 2017  |  VOLUME 17  |  NUMBER 1
syndrome and the more intractable complex PTSD which 
the American Psychological Association’s redesignated 
from “anxiety disorders” into a new category of “trauma 
and stress disorders” in the DSM V.6 Exposure to both acute 
stress, or certain types of chronic stressors can cause 
individuals to experience a wide range of harmful physical, 
emotional, and cognitive symptoms, which in turn greatly 
affect quality of life, interpersonal relationships, as well as 
learning and attention. 
Your explanation of the global effects of repeated cycles of 
excess neurotransmitters on the brain seems to predict or 
parallel PTSD. Are there any clues in your Creativity Machine 
paradigm for how such changes might be reversed?
STEVE: In the model I have offered, PTSD is more a 
manifestation of the associative gestalt chains that have 
cumulatively formed within cortex, either due to one or more 
traumatic episodes, or stressors applied over long periods. 
All I can say here is that the best perturbative regimes for 
altering such chains are either during synaptic calm, during 
which the brain may cumulatively rewire itself, or during 
intense adrenaline surges when new episodic learning 
may create selective amnesia of older trauma experiences, 
replacing them with new sensations and feelings.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
 
KRISTEN: After the research and discussion of Steve’s work, 
I am left with a different set of questions and possibilities 
in my personal theory of mind than I started with. The 
parallels between the functioning of Creativity Machines 
and biological brains are clear. The CMs have the elements 
of cognition that biological brains do, perception, memory, 
awareness, recall, self-monitoring of recall and internal 
process, and most importantly, creativity. It appears that 
two very important qualities of biological consciousness—
subjectivity, and privileged access, may likewise be 
emulated through this same paradigm, leaving us to 
ponder the “hard problem of consciousness” through this 
same theoretical framework.
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KRISTEN: Are you saying, then, that the boundaries 
between “normal” and “mentally ill” are more a matter of 
social convention than scientific designation? 
STEVE: We are at the mercy of society when it comes to a 
definition of mental illness, and you know by now what I 
think of definitions. From a pragmatic perspective, I see 
value in making the dysfunctional functional, but then we 
face the dilemma of encouraging and enabling disruptive 
individuals and ideologies that make the rest of us crazy, 
leading me to conclude that it’s all a zero-sum game. 
By extension, we need to ask whether societies can 
themselves become mentally ill. After all, we are immersed 
in a swarm of neural network-based brains joined by chaotic 
connections. In the end, we collectively invent mental 
status to individuals in the same way the brain invents 
significance to the sum of its internal physical and chemical 
events (i.e., consciousness). Oftentimes, I believe, that 
such collective consciousness, does immense harm to 
individuals, often leading to the misdiagnosis of creative 
genius as insanity or even criminality. In the most extreme 
of these cases, there is a persecution of the creative by 
what I would call the rigid, anal types that live their lives on 
the straight and narrow course, never achieving anything 
more than reproductive success.
So, boiling down your question to the very faulty natural 
language, yes, it’s largely social convention behind the 
classification of “normal” and “mentally ill,” bolstered by 
what many in my field of artificial neural nets call “folk 
psychology.”
KRISTEN: I remember reading in one of your articles, or 
perhaps it was in an earlier conversation, the idea that 
some mental deterioration or a perspective shift away 
from “normal” might be the result of the global effects of 
cycles of stress on the brain. Would you mind clarifying that 
please?
STEVE: In a nutshell, we all live in a competitive and stressful 
environment, with the primary stressors being caused by 
other competing individuals. Thus, we are always creatively 
scheming to achieve success, and according to the 
neurobiological model embodied in the Creativity Machine 
paradigm, excess neurotransmitters such as adrenaline 
and noradrenaline must be secreted within the brain to 
warp existing memories into new ideas. In so doing, the 
perceptual components of the brain become incapacitated. 
As this mind-warping occurs, the ideational component 
becomes attention deficit and subject to hallucination.5 
The perceptual component becomes stuck in an incorrect 
interpretation of these ideations, preventing the brain from 
performing the needed hypothesis testing to separate 
fact from fantasy. In effect, it’s the perfect neurobiological 
storm wherein we give ourselves a “mental hernia” (a.k.a., 
mental illness).
So, in answer to your question, over successive cycles of 
associative chaining, twisted ideations or perceptions can 
strengthen and habituate to cause lasting dysfunctionality. 
KRISTEN: This answer brings to mind post-traumatic stress 
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What is temperature?
Is it mental? 
or physical?
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is it rather hot!
can I open the window?
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in this spirit, as of XVII century, 
savants have singled out so called 
objective physical properties!
i KNOW, i KNOW, SINCE 
dESCARTES WE ARE USED TO 
THINK THAT THERE ARE 
OBJECTIVE PHYSICAL PROPER-
TIES AND SUBJECTIVE MENTAL 
ONES!
HOT!











same relative property T
in fact, the so-called objective properties have been 
SELECTED only because the tool to pick them up can be 
easily replicated in a standardized way. I can easily du-
plicate a mercury thermometer and each replica will 










hei! wait a minute! is there really 
difference between 
a mercury column 
and, SAY, another 
organism, which is, 
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other systems are not
different from the 
termomether, only they 





we can finally unmask the
subjective and the objective as 
nothing but relative properties 
of different practical use
subjective and objective 
properties are just 
relative properties that 
were erroneously taken to 
be separate.  
TRick TEve TTom T1
T2
each system




is not more objective, is 









each system singles out
its own relative 
physical properties.







we can thus pull back 
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that do not 
depend on the observer? 
      for instance, Am I not moving 
at fantastic speed right now?
nope! as every schoolboy knows, 
velocity is always relative! in this  





the fact is well known but it 
is always amazing. The same 
object, this cannonball, has 
multiple velocities at the 
same time!
each velocity
 is relative to another 
object and each velocity is 
as physical 
as everything else! 
all physical properties 
are like 
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what about size? surely size is 
not relative! isn’t it?
size too is relative! 
it depends on the 








alleged absolute size is nothing 
but relative size, relative to an 
object at zero distance, as when 










I am not that 
big!
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Objects too are relative! a wonderful 
yet familiar example is the rainbow! 
there is not one rainbow! 
there are as many rainbows 
as there are observers! 
no matter of what kind!




Existence is not 
relative to a 
subject!
existence is 





this is object 
relativism!
it happens with time too! imagine two lights
switching on and off alternatively. Depending 
on where one is located in space, the lights 
will either flash together or not!















are neither mental 
nor subjective, 
they are physical 
and external as 
everything else! 


















The board is 
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few of them 
because they 
were easier 




historically, the human 
body has been the 
implicit reference 
frame for an 
alleged absolute 
physical world.
We mistook the 
world that is 
relative to 
average human 
bodies and their 
preferred tools 
for the real 
world.
This is not the case! 
yes! i said SOME-
THING SIMILAR IN 
360 BC!
A relative






the standard physical word is only a subset of a 
broader collection of relative properties. Everything is relative.
on the contrary, such 
a world is just a 
subset of a wider 
world of relative 
properties that 
we reach in our 
everyday life due 
to the unique 
differences 
among bodies.









“A thing genuinely is if it has 
some capacity either to act on 
another thing or to be acted 
on. What marks off the things 
that are as being is nothing 
other than capacity.”
7
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reality exists
only relative to 
something else. 
In our case, it exists 
relative to our body. 
for instance, 
when I turn around
my body changes and









































What about the traditional question:
If a tree falls in a forest and 
no one is around to hear it, 
does it make a sound?
oooh!!!
any sound?
the bottom line is that everything exists relative to other things. 
 
In this way, idealism is dodged and we have a completely relational account of 
reality. reality is no longer split in a subjective and objective side.
the physical is relative ... and relative here means causally active. 
A relation is nothing but a causal process. ù
we can also overcome the traditional 
naive materialism that has conceived 
physical entities as though they were 
absolute and autonomous.
reality is relative! but physical nonetheless.
the sound too is a relative object 
and thus, to take place, requires a 
hearing system. Not a mind, but a 
proper additional object!
i DO NOT EXIST 
AUTONOMOUSLY. 
NOR AM i A MENTAL 
THING! i exist insofar 
I take place in a 
certain way be-
cause there is a 










a shade of 
grass! 
and what about the 
tree? Is the tree 
there as I see it 
when no one is 
around?
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